Judicial Powers of Non-Judges: The Legitimacy of Referee Functions in Minnesota Courts by Stuart, John M.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 2
1980
Judicial Powers of Non-Judges: The Legitimacy of
Referee Functions in Minnesota Courts
John M. Stuart
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Stuart, John M. (1980) "Judicial Powers of Non-Judges: The Legitimacy of Referee Functions in Minnesota Courts," William Mitchell
Law Review: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss1/2
JUDICIAL POWERS OF NON-JUDGES: THE
LEGITIMACY OF REFEREE FUNCTIONS IN
MINNESOTA COURTS
by JOHN M. STUARTt
Important questions concerning the role of referees in Minnesota's courts
are in the process of legislative resolution. In this Article, Mr. Stuart
examines the historical origins andfunctions of referees, and their account-
abilty to the judica y. His investigation oers important insights into
the efects any proposed change in the role of referees might have on our
judicial system, with an emphasis on the legiimacy of referee decision
making. While not supporting any speqjftc proposal, this Article dis-
cusses important considerations by which any future legislation should be
examined Mr. Stuart's analysis ofers a starting point for the reader to
formulate an intelligent assessment of how referees are used, and how they
should be used in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION: JUDGES, REFEREES, AND THE 1977
LEGISLATURE-A DISPUTE WITH A HISTORY
The 1977 Court Reorganization Act' thrust the work of referees
1. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 432, 1977 Minn. Laws 1147 (amending scattered sections
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in Minnesota's courts into public controversy. By abolishing the
position of referee,2 the Act pushed into the spotlight such obscure
academic questions as "what is judging?" Caseload statistics
clearly demonstrate the referees' usefulness to the judges of the
various trial courts3 and seemingly favor the retention of referees.
In contrast, arguments against the employment of referees are in-
tangible and diverse, though they share a due process flavor: refer-
ees make decisions that should be made by juries
4 or by judges;5
referees put juvenile defendants in fifth amendment double jeop-
ardy; 6 referees are not adequately supervised; 7 and, referees are not
democratically elected. 8 The complete abolition of referees by the
Legislature was a demonstration of strong concern over these pos-
sibilities. Suddenly, however, the judiciary, the bar, and the pub-
lic realized that unless the Legislature could provide an alternative
of MINN. STAT. chs. 2, 15A, 43, 271, 480, 484, 485, 487, 488, 488A, 490, 524, 525, 530, 531,
532, 633 (1976)).
2. See id. § 48, 1977 Minn. Laws at 1168 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the position of referee in the county, municipal and district courts of the state is
hereby abolished.") (current version at MINN. STAT. § 484.70 (1978 & Supp. 1979)). The
Act scheduled the abolition of referees to become effective on July 31, 1978. See 1d. § 50,
1977 Minn. Laws at 1168. Before it became effective, however, the position of referee was
reinstated by the 1978 Legislature. See notes 11-14 thfta and accompanying text.
3. See Letter from Jack M. Provo, Hennepin County Court Administrator, to Lau-
rence Harmon, State Court Administrator (June 27, 1978) (on file at William Mitchell
Law Review office) (assessing impact of abolition of part-time referees in Hennepin
County); cf Interview with Judge Ronald E. Hachey, former Chief Judge of Ramsey
County District Court (Nov. 2, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office)
(noting that civil calendar will suffer if referees are abolished); D. McLean, The Hennepin
County Family Court 59 (1977) ("Approximately 84 percent of the contacts between the
court and the public are made by referees .... ") (footnote omitted). But cf. Interview
with William E. Haugh, Jr., former Chairman of Family Law Section, Minnesota State
Bar Association (Oct. 28, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office) (weighted
workload statistics, showing that judges are working to capacity and cannot assume the
duties of referees, are not available).
4. Cf Parness, The Parajudge-Oihg the Wheels ofjustice, TRIAL, Mar.-Apr. 1974, at
55 (compulsory use of parajudge might deny right to trial by jury).
5. See, e.g., Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen (Nov. 3, 1977) (on file at
William Mitchell Law Review office).
6. See Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (D. Md. 1977) (Maryland proce-
dure permitting state to appeal juvenile court master's finding of nondelinquency violates
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy), revI'd, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). See gener-
ally notes 124-37 in fra and accompanying text.
7. See Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5; cf Interview
with State Representative Gorden 0. Voss (Nov. 10, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell
Law Review office) (referees do same work as judges but not subject to same sanctions).
8. See Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5. See also MINN.
CONST. art. VI, § 7 ("[Judges] shall be elected by the voters from the area which they are
to serve . . ").
1980]
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before July 31, 1978, 9 the loss of these previously inconspicuous
quasi-judges would throw Minnesota's heaviest court calendars
into a turmoil.' 0
On the last day of the 1978 session the Legislature acted, passing
chapter 750 of the 1978 laws. I' This statute (1978 law) met the
most urgent concerns of the referees and the courts by permitting
incumbent full-time referees to continue to serve at the pleasure of
the chief judges of their judicial districts.12 The bill also began the
process of circumscribing referee functions by precluding referees
from hearing contested juvenile trials and, except by stipulation of
both parties, contested final trials in family court matters.' 3 Pre-
sumably, time formerly spent handling these prohibited duties will
be taken up by additional work in the general civil calendar. The
1978 law explicitly frees family and juvenile court referees to take
on assignments outside those specialized courts, at the discretion of
the chief judge.
14
Because the 1978 legislation appears to be only a temporary so-
lution, major problems remain to be resolved. For example, what
will happen when the present referees retire or resign?' 5 What will
happen if the family and juvenile court caseloads continue to ex-
9. This was the effective date of that section of the 1977 Act which abolished the
position of referee in Minnesota courts. Se Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 432, § 50, 1977 Minn.
Laws 1147, 1168 (repealed 1978).
10. According to Jack M. Provo, Hennepin County Court Administrator, "[t]here is
no way we can function without referees. We couldn't possibly handle the caseload in
juvenile and family courts." Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 10, 1977, at 1. In Ramsey
County, former Chief Judge Ronald E. Hachey said that the civil calendar will suffer if
the referees are abolished. See Interview with Judge Ronald E. Hachey, supra note 3.
11. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 484.70 (1976 & Supp. 1977)).
12. See id. (amending MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1976 & Supp. 1977)).
13. See id. ("No referee sitting in family court may hear any final trial involving a
contested case if either party or his attorney objects in writing to the assignment of a
referee to hear the matter.") (amending MINN. STAT. § 484.70(2) (1976 & Supp. 1977));
id. ("No referee sitting in juvenile court may hear a contested trial on any petition, or any
motion made pursuant to section 260.125.") (amending MINN. STAT. § 484.70(3) (1976 &
Supp. 1977)).
14. See id. ("All referees are subject to the administrative authority and assignment
power of the chiefjudge of the district. . . and are not limited to assignment to the family
or juvenile court.") (amending MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1976 & Supp. 1977)).
15. The statute only provides that "[plersons holding the office of referee full time on
June 30, 1977 . . . may continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the district
under the terms and conditions of their appointment." Id. (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 484.70(1) (1976 & Supp. 1977)). Although the present referees are covered by the stat-
ute, no provision is made for hiring additional referees. Thus, as the law presently stands,
referees will become extinct as they retire or resign, because they will not be replaced.
[Vol. 6
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pand?16 What effect will the provision subjecting all referees to
the general assignment power of the chief judgeI7 have on the tra-
dition of the referees' special expertise in family and juvenile
courts?' 8  The 1978 law further mandates that the Minnesota
Supreme Court study and review:
whether the office of referee . . . should be retained or abol-
ished; whether, if it is recommended that referees . . . be re-
tained, their powers and duties should be modified; whether, in
the event that some or all of the existing offices of referee...
are recommended for abolition, new judgeships should be cre-
ated and in which districts; whether a consolidated family divi-
sion should be created in the district or county municipal courts
of Hennepin and Ramsey counties, and what categories of cases
should be assigned thereto; and any other issues the court
deems relevant to the function of the office of referee. . . in the
state court system.19
Because the law requests the court to report its recommendations
to the Legislature by October 1, 1980,20 it appears that a compre-
hensive plan for the function of referees is destined to emerge from
the court in time for the next legislative session. Perhaps some of
the major questions will be answered when the court complies with
the Legislature's directive.
This Article is directed primarily to those readers who are con-
cerned with the future of referees in Minnesota and with the more
general question of when and how judicial authority may be dele-
gated. Its purposes are fivefold:
(1) to provide background information on present referee
functions;
2 '
16. The Hennepin County Court Administrator, Jack M. Provo, said, "We have
trouble with the [juvenile and family court] caseload even with the referees." Minneapolis
Tribune, supra note 10. In Ramsey County, the caseload of the family court is so great
that already it is unable to give litigants sufficient time. Interview with William E.
Haugh, Jr., supra note 3.
17. See MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978).
18. One judge has expressed her belief that if referees were made judges, they would
have to rotate, which would destroy their special expertise in family court matters. See
Letter from Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, Hennepin County District Court, to John Stuart
(Nov. 29, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
19. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 910. The Minnesota State
Bar Association has also recommended further study and consideration of the use of refer-
ees in Minnesota courts. See Interview with Jonathan Morgan, Chairman of the Judicial
Administration Comm., Minnesota State Bar Association (Nov. 3, 1977) (on file at Wil-
liam Mitchell Law Review office).
20. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 910.
21. See notes 64-263 thfra and accompanying text.
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(2) to trace the historical evolution of referees; 22
(3) to summarize the leading proposals for restructuring the
work of referees;
23
(4) to offer a theoretical framework within which these pro-
posals may be evaluated;24 and finally,
(5) to reach some conclusions as to how the decision-making
powers of our courts should be allocated between judges
and their quasi-judicial colleagues, the referees.
2 5
Historical background is particularly important. One could eas-
ily infer from the dramatic actions of the 1977 and 1978 Legisla-
tures that the dispute over referees is a new one. In fact, referees
have been part of the Minnesota court system for over 125 years
26
and have antecedents that can be traced back even further into the
Anglo-American judicial past.2 7 This history has not been tran-
quil. There has been a persistent tension between the needs of
judges to delegate some of their functions and the concern of par-
ties to a controversy who insist that legitimate authority support
the decisions that resolve their conflicts.
28
22. See notes 39-63, 67-73 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 329-83 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 384-444 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 445-49 byn/a and accompanying text.
26. An 1849 statute first made legislative provision for the use of chancery masters in
the territory of Minnesota. See Act of Nov. 1, 1849, ch. XX, ch. II, § 48, 1849 Minn. Terr
Sess. Laws 55, 63-64 (repealed 1851). The statute allowed the appointment of a master in
chancery when the judge was on vacation. See id. In 1851 the Territorial Legislature
passed revised statutes that repealed all provisions of the 1849 laws that were inconsistent
with the revised statutes. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 137, § 1 (1851). The 1851
revised statutes also made provision for trial by referee, see 1ad. ch. 71, §§ 47-54, but in a
much more detailed manner than the 1849 law. Compare id. with Act of Nov. 1, 1849, ch.
XX, ch. It, § 48, 1849 Minn. Terr. Sess. Laws 55, 63-64 (repealed 1851).
It is interesting to note that no reference was made in the 1851 session laws to the fact
that the 1851 revised statutes were enacted into law by the Legislature. The revised stat-
utes were, however, passed by the House of Representatives, see MINN. TERR. H.R. JOUR.
196 (1851), and the Counsel. See MINN. TERR. COUNSEL JOUR. 179 (1851) (reporting
that Governor Ramsey had signed the bill). The absence of any reference in the 1851
session laws to the 1851 revised statutes may be explained by the fact that the authoriza-
tion for the printing of the session laws is contained in the bound version of the revised
statutes. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 135, § 2 (1851). Further, nothing in the Or-
ganic Act of Minnesota required the publishing of laws passed by the Legislature. See Act
of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. CXXI, § 20, 9 Stat. 403, 409 (1849).
27. See notes 67-73 z'nfta and accompanying text.
28. Compare Interview with Judge Andrew A. Glenn, Ramsey County Probate Court
(Nov. 22, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office) ("If a judge is going to do
a good job, he has to be relieved of some of the time-consuming work.") wih Interview
with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5 (referee decision making objectionable
because judging should be done by judges).
[Vol. 6
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Members of the 1977 Legislature were not the first to complain
that referees are not accountable to the public.29 But the action
taken in the 1977 session-away with all referees!-was too sweep-
ing. There were babes in the murky bathwater the Legislature
threw out, some of whom are the legitimate offspring of the spe-
cialized courts in Minnesota's most populous counties. These off-
spring are appropriate referee functions. Some of them have
developed under the guidance of many generations of concerned
parents. An understanding of the origins of referees and the long
struggle over their role should help the people who must decide
the proper functions of referees to determine intelligently what
kinds of authority properly can be delegated and what kinds can
not.
II. REFEREES IN THE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
PRESENT SYSTEM
To convey the magnitude of the present controversy surround-
ing referees, the institutions that may be affected by future legisla-
tion must be examined. The specialized courts in Hennepin
County undoubtedly would experience the greatest impact from
any change because this county employs more referees, with a
wider range of responsibilities, than any other court system. 30 At
present the Hennepin County specialized courts employ sixteen
full-time referees: Juvenile Court employs five; Family Court and
Probate Court each employ four; the Examiner of Titles employs
two; and there is one Special Term referee. 31 The Hennepin
29. See, e.g., Bryant, The Ofte of Master in Chanceg.: Eary English Development, 40
A.B.A.J. 501, 533 & n.39 (1954) ("That the Masters in Chancery have always exercised
judicial authority ... and have done judicial acts, not warranted by the King's Commis-
sion .... ") (quoting S. BURROUGHS, THE LEGAL JUDICATURE IN CHANCERY 93-94
(London 1727)). The English chancery masters are the predecessors of the modern Ameri-
can referees. See notes 67-69 itnfa and accompanying text.
30. See Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 10, 1977, at I (most Minnesota referees are em-
ployed in Hennepin County); cf. Finch, Court Rform-So/ution or Problem?, HENNEPIN
LAw., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 9 ("Because the Hennepin County courts utilize referees so ex-
tensively, many judges and administrative personnel are seriously concerned about their
prospective elimination.").
31. See Provo, Referee System in Hennepin County (Nov. 1977) (unpublished report)
(on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Mr. Provo notes, however, that there are
three referees in the Examiner of Titles office: the examiner and two deputy examiners of
title. See id. The Hennepin County Examiner of Titles believes that only the two deputies
are referees, both because of their functions and their classification under the Hennepin
County civil service system as "court referee." See Letter from Richard W. Edblom, Hen-
1980]
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County Conciliation Court employs referees on a per diem basis.32
Additionally, Hennepin County employs two administrative hear-
ing officers who perform certain limited functions in traffic mat-
ters. 3
3
Future legislation involving referees would also have a marked
effect on the Ramsey County court system, which employs two
full-time and one part-time referee in Juvenile Court, three full-
time referees in Family Court, and one referee in Probate Court.
34
Unlike Hennepin County, Ramsey County has no referees or ad-
ministrative hearing officers in its Title Examination Department,
Traffic Court, or in Special Term.
35
At present, there is only one referee employed outside the Hen-
nepin-Ramsey County area; St. Louis County District Court em-
ploys a referee to hear domestic relations matters. 36 County courts
across the state do, however, employ more than thirty "judicial
nepin County Examiner of Titles, to John Stuart (Dec. 1, 1977) (on file at William Mitch-
ell Law Review office).
Recent enactments of the Minnesota Legislature, however, have removed title exam-
iners from that class of court personnel known as referees. See notes 218-23 bnfta and ac-
companying text.
32. See Letter from Jack M. Provo, supra note 3; Interview with Gordon Griller, for-
mer Assistant Hennepin County Municipal Court Administrator (Nov. 1, 1977) (on file at
William Mitchell Law Review office).
33. See Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32.
34. See Interview with G.A. Hatfield, Ramsey County Court Administrator (Oct. 26,
1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
35. Cf Interview with Ron Bushinski, Ramsey County Municipal Court Administra-
tor (Nov. 14, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office) (no referees or hearing
officers employed in Ramsey County Municipal Court); Interview with G.A. Hatfield,
supra note 34 (Ramsey County employs referees in family, probate, and juvenile courts).
On August 1, 1979, Ramsey County began the limited use of referees in its concilia-
tion court. Interview with Ron Bushinski, Ramsey County Court Administrator (Aug. 24,
1979) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Because this use of referees in
Ramsey County is of such recent origin, it will not be discussed in this Article. The discus-
sion of other conciliation court referees is probably applicable to those in Ramsey County.
For the discussion of referees in Hennepin County Conciliation Court, see notes 245-53
supra and accompanying text.
36. See Issue Paper for Planning Subcommittee of Judicial Planning Committee,
Abolishing of Position of Court Referee: Hennepin and Ramsey Counties 15 (Dec. 12,
1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office); notes 160, 176 infta and accompa-
nying text.
The St. Louis County Examiner of Titles also conducts hearings involving real estate
matters. See Letter from Robert C. Brown, St. Louis County Examiner of Titles (Oct. 9,
1979) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Title examiners, however, no
longer can be considered referees. See notes 218-23 infia and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6
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officers."'37 Although some of the functions of judicial officers are
analogous to those of referees, the former have different historical
origins and somewhat broader powers. 38 Because of these differ-
ences, the issue of what, if anything, should be done with the posi-
tion of judicial officer is outside the ambit of this Article.
Any future legislation pertaining to referees will affect the court
systems in Hennepin, Ramsey, and St. Louis Counties. Because all
of these counties have large urban populations, the question at the
heart of the present referee controversy may well be how best to
deliver legal decisions to people in cities, where population density
and other conditions of urban life contribute to an enormous vol-
ume of human problems. In the past, the urban courts have relied
heavily on referees to aid in handling the sheer mass of litigation
they face. Whether this reliance should continue can only be de-
cided after careful examination of specific referee functions in the
system as it now exists.
III. THE FUNCTION OF REFEREES IN MINNESOTA'S
SPECIALIZED COURTS
Each referee position has its own legal origin and its own func-
tion to be performed. Any broad legislative change will tamper
with each of these roles and historical traditions in a different way.
To understand the effects of any proposed reform, one must ex-
amine each referee position in light of its own characteristics, func-
tion, and historical evolution. Minnesota first made legislative
provision for referees in 1851. 3 9 It is uncertain whether the statute
authorizing referees created the position or merely recognized an
existing practice. 40 In any event, legislation in 1853 made it clear
that the powers bestowed on referees came from the court's juris-
37. See Issue Paper for Planning Subcommittee of Judicial Planning Committee,
supra note 36, at 1.
38. See generally Johnson & Stuart, Minnesona'sjudiial Ofters: A Short Hitog of an En-
dangered Species, BENCH & B., Dec. 1979, at 23.
39. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 71, §§ 47-54 (1851) (repealed 1905).
40. See Fair v. Stickney Farm Co., 35 Minn. 380, 382, 29 N.W. 49, 50 (1886) ("In
[equity] cases the court does not get its power to order a reference from the statute. The
statute regulates the exercise of a power previously existing,-possibly restricts it, or, in
some particulars, enlarges it."); cf. State ex rel Rockwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 213 Minn.
184, 192, 6 N.W.2d 251, 258 (1942) ("[appointing referees] has been practiced by courts of
equity since time immemorial, and without statutory authority"); Toulmin v. Becker, 94
Ohio App. 524, 529, 115 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1952) ("a court of chancery has the inherent
power to order a reference").
1980]
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diction to hear equity matters.4 1 This was an important clarifica-
tion, because in actions at law, as opposed to equity, parties have a
constitutional right to a jury trial.42 The Minnesota Supreme
Court specifically recognized this jury trial right in St. Paul &Sioux
City Railroad v. Gardner.43 In that decision, the court held that the
process of referring a matter to a referee cannot be compelled in an
action at law. To the extent that any statute allowed compulsory
reference, it was ruled unconstitutional.
45
With the merger of law and equity courts,46 confusion devel-
oped over what cases were properly subject to compulsory refer-
ence. In an 1886 case,47 the court adopted what seemed to be a
logical procedure; if, from the pleadings, an action appeared to be
one that formerly would have been heard in equity, a reference
could be ordered even against the wishes of the parties.48 As evi-
denced a few years later by Bond v. Welcome,49 however, this solu-
tion was not a complete answer to the question of which cases
should be heard by referees. In Bond the plaintiff sought money
damages, traditionally a remedy granted at law, in pleadings
which revealed that a long accounting would be necessary to de-
termine the rights of the parties, traditionally an equitable rem-
edy.50 Had the case clearly been one that, prior to the merger of
law and equity, would have been an equitable action for an ac-
41. See Act of Mar. 5, 1853, ch. I, § 10, 1853 Minn. Terr. Sess. Laws 3, 4 ("In all cases
where, in chancery before this act took effect, masters and examiners were required to act,
or might have acted, the like acts and duties shall and may hereafter be performed when
necessary, by a referee or referees appointed as in civil actions.") (repealed 1866).
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . .');
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall
extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy.").
43. 19 Minn. 132 (Gil. 99) (1872).
44. See id. at 137-38, 141 (Gil. at 103, 107) (compulsory reference in action at law held
unconstitutional).
45. See id.
46. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1851) (repealed 1905) ("there shall be in
this territory hereafter, but one form of action . . . to be called a civil action . . ').
This is the forerunner of rule 2 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. See MINN. R.
CIv. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.'"). After law
and equity were merged, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the merger did not
affect the court's power to order a reference. See Berkey v. Judd, 14 Minn. 394, 399 (Gil.
300, 303) (1869).
47. Fair v. Stickney Farm Co., 35 Minn. 380, 29 N.W. 49 (1886).
48. See id. at 381-82, 29 N.W. at 50.
49. 61 Minn. 43, 63 N.W. 3 (1895).
50. See id. at 43-44, 63 N.W. at 3-4.
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counting, there would have been no difficulty in ordering a refer-
ence. Unfortunately the pleadings made the case an action at
law.5 1 To resolve this dilemma, the Bond court looked through the
surface of the pleadings, defined an "action for an accounting"
broadly, and then ordered a reference.5 2 Whether the holding in
Bond represents an unlawful denial of the right to trial by jury or
an intelligent allocation of scarce decision-making resources re-
mains an open question today.
53
Of course, the right to a jury trial in actions at law has always
been subject to waiver.54 Thus, in addition to equitable actions in
which reference could be compelled, many cases were disposed of
through reference by stipulation after a jury trial had been
waived.5 5 The only major issue presented by a stipulated reference
is whether the stipulation is truly voluntary and not coerced by the
court.56 The tendency in Minnesota has been to uphold the valid-
ity of a stipulated reference even when the trial court appears to
51. See id. ("If this is an action at law for the recovery of money only, the plaintiff is
entitled absolutely to a trial by jury . . . .It is true, the prayer of the complaint is for the
recovery of money only . . '').
52. See id. at 44-45, 63 N.W. at 4 ("[I]f the amount for which judgment is demanded
can only be ascertained by an accounting between the parties, it is an equitable [ac-
tion]."). Cases involving long accounts were never tried before Minnesota juries anyway.
See Berkey v. Judd, 14 Minn. 394, 399-400 (Gil. 300, 303) (1869) ("No court should ever
submit the taking of such accounts to a jury.").
Without discussing the form of the pleadings, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has per-
mitted compulsory reference when long accounts are involved, whether the action is legal
or equitable. See Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 517, 133 N.W. 632, 634 (1911). But
see Barnes v. Barnes, 282 Ill. 593, 598, 118 N.E. 1004, 1006 (1918) ("The duties of the
court, the public interest, and the rights of the litigants forbid the examination by the
court of intricate and complex accounts."); but cf. Steck v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 142
N.Y. 236, 37 N.E. 1 (1894) (reference denied when need for accounting arises from defend-
ant's counterclaim rather than plaintiff's complaint).
53. Broadly defining an equitable action for purposes of reference, the Bond decision
confined St. Paul & Sioux City Railroad within narrow limits. Compare St. Paul & S.C.R.R.
v. Gardner, 19 Minn. 132, 136-37 (Gil. 99, 102) (1872) ("[A]n order which directs a refer-
ence in a case in which a reference is not authorized by law is appealable.") with Bond v.
Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 45, 63 N.W. 3, 4 (1895) ("[A]n order directing a compulsory refer-
ence is not an appealable order."). According to the court in State ex rel. Rockwell v.
State Bd. of Educ., 213 Minn. 184, 6 N.W.2d 251 (1942), "in Minnesota, the only limita-
tion upon a court's power to appoint a referee is that it cannot be exercised in actions
purely at law in which there was an absolute right of trial by jury as the law stood at the
time of the adoption of our constitution." Id. at 192, 6 N.W.2d at 258. Apparently, Min-
nesota courts still possess broad powers to order a reference.
54. See, e.g., St. Paul & S.C.R.R. v. Gardner, 19 Minn. 132, 143 (Gil. 99, 109) (1872).
55. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581, 583 (1878) (approving reference by
consent in actions at law).
56. See, e.g., Bohles v. Boland, 44 Minn. 481, 481, 47 N.W. 155, 155 (1890).
1980]
11
Stuart: Judicial Powers of Non-Judges: The Legitimacy of Referee Function
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
have applied some coercion in convincing the parties to waive
their jury trial rights.
57
The most extensive nineteenth-century discussion of the referees'
position in Minnesota took place in Carson v. Smith. 58 In Carson the
court confronted directly the question of whether referees repre-
sented "a diversion of the judicial power of the State from its legit-
imate channels, and a location of it in unauthorized hands.
''59
Although the statute that recognized referees had been in existence
only nine years,6° the court recognized the importance of their
work in words that sound curiously modern: "[p]robably there is
no act upon the statute book under which more interests have
been affected, more rights passed, and property involved, than the
statute authorizing the appointment of referees . *... ,,6 The
court could only justify the great power of the referees, however,
by explaining that their work was merely what defenders of the
chancery masters called ministerial.62 The Carson court also based
the legitimacy of referees on the fact that they operated on a case-
by-case basis.63 At that time there was no such thing as a perma-
57. See id. (absence of express objection means consent to reference); Deering v. Mc-
Carthy, 36 Minn. 302, 302, 30 N.W. 813, 813 (1886) (reference upheld even though made
a condition to permitting defendant to amend answer).
58. 5 Minn. 78 (Gil. 58) (1860).
59. Id. at 87 (Gil. at 61).
60. See id'. at 86 (Gil. at 61); MINN. REv. TERR. STAT. ch. 71, §§ 47-54 (1851) (re-
pealed 1905).
61. 5 Minn. at 86 (Gil. at 61); cf. D. McLean, supra note 3 ("Approximately 84 per-
cent of the contacts between the court and the public are made by the referees .... ")
(footnote omitted). See generaly Interview with Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, Hennepin
County District Court (Nov. 1, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
62. Proponents of the use of chancery masters in the English courts alleged that the
masters performed ministerial functions only. See Bryant, supra note 29, at 500 (English
chancery masters were merely assistants and had no judicial power) (reviewing S. BUR-
ROUGHS, THE HISTORY OF THE CHANCERY (1726)). For an explanation of the relation-
ship between English chancery masters and modern referees, see notes 67-73 infra and
accompanying text.
Justifying the referees' powers, the Minnesota Supreme Court said in Carson:
The court speaks and operates through the referee, its subordinate officer. The
referee exerts no power proprio vigore. Without the Court he could have no exis-
tence; without the Court he could not act after his creation; and without confir-
mation and adoption by the Court, his acts have no force or validity whatever.
Nothing can originate before a referee, and nothing can terminate with or by the
decision of a referee. The Court acquires the jurisdiction, and the Court renders
the judgment upon the controversy, therefore the whole exercise of the judicial
power is by the Court, the referee acting only in an intermediate capacity as an
auxiliary to the Court in the ascertainment of certain facts and law necessary to
its enlightenment in giving the proper decree or judgment.
5 Minn. at 87-88 (Gil. at 62).
63. See 5 Minn. at 87 (Gil. at 61).
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nent referee.
A. Henneptn County Special Term Referee
In 1975 the Hennepin County District Court hired a referee to
hear special term matters.64 Although this position appears to be a
recent creation, in fact, the special term referee is an outgrowth of
a long historical tradition. More than any other modern quasi-
judicial figure, the special term referee functions like a master in
chancery. 65 While there is not a perfect correspondence between
these two offices, there are enough parallels to make it worthwhile
to take a brief look at the chancery master's history.
66
The Minnesota Supreme Court has described the appointment
of referees as "a practice as old as our system of jurisprudence,
[that] has been practiced by courts of equity since time immemo-
rial."' 67 This is a clear recognition of the continuity between the
English chancery master and the American referee.68 In England,
the office of master was created because the expansion of equity
jurisdiction made the chancellor feel overworked. 69 Not surpris-
ingly, the issue of whether too much authority was being delegated
to masters arose very early. The dispute led Chancellor Bacon,
early in the seventeenth century, to withdraw the masters' power
to hear and determine cases. 70 This controversy, which centered
on the question of whether the masters were mere assistants per-
forming only "ministerial" work or whether they were usurpers of
the chancellor's authority, persevered in England well into the
64. See Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, Hennepin County Special Term Referee
(Nov. 21, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Ramsey County District
Court does not employ a special term referee. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying
text.
65. See Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64.
66. Cf. Act of Mar. 5, 1853, ch. I, § 10, 1853 Minn. Terr. Sess. Laws 3, 4 ("In all cases
where, in chancery before this act took effect, masters and examiners were required to act,
or might have acted, the like acts and duties shall and may hereafter be performed when
necessary, by a referee or referees appointed as in civil actions.") (repealed 1866).
67. State cx rel. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 213 Minn. 184, 192, 6 N.W.2d 251,
258 (1942).
68. Cf Silberman, Masters and Magstrates Part P The English Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1070, 1070-72 & 1070 n.l & 1071 n.2 (1975) (federal magistrates and state court para-
judges modeled after English chancery masters).
69. See id. at 1076-79 (as judges' terms increased, work of masters expanded to include
more judicial matters); cf. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II" The American Analogue,
50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1975) (use of masters frees additional time for judges).
70. See Comment, Masters and Teir Fees, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 403, 405 (1949).
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eighteenth century. 7' The American colonies, however, did not
hesitate to appoint masters to hear equitable actions.7 2  Indeed,
one legal scholar has concluded that by the time of the Revolu-
tionary War all the more populous colonies were using masters in
one capacity or another, under a variety of names.
73
Minnesota continued to assign referees case-by-case in the nine-
teenth century. 74 As time went on, other states that had retained
separate courts of equity developed the position of "standing
master."' 75 When the Hennepin County District Court created the
position of Special Term Referee, it shaped the duties of the job to
correspond to those of an equity court's standing master in several
important respects.
76
The Special Term Referee almost exclusively hears matters that
formerly fell into the realm of equity: marriage dissolutions, trust
matters, and actions for accounting. 77 In addition, the position
71. Samuel Burroughs wrote a history of chancery in 1726 which claimed that the
role of the masters was as mere assistants, performing ministerial work only. See Bryant,
supra note 29, at 500 (discussing S. BURROUGHS, THE HISTORY OF CHANCERY (1726)); cf.
5 BAYLOR L. REV. 374, 375 (1953) (several others regard masters as purely ministerial
officers). Burroughs' view was immediately refuted in a rival book by the Earl of Hard-
wicke, who took the position that the masters had, in practice, broader powers than Bur-
roughs had acknowledged. See Bryant, supra, at 500-01 (discussing P. YORKE, A
DISCOURSE OF THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY BELONGING TO THE OFFICE OF MASTER OF
THE ROLLS IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY (London 1727)).
72. See Bryant, The Ojfie of Master in Chancery. Colonial Development, 40 A.B.A.J. 595
passim (1954). For example, by 1686 Connecticut had appointed five people to perform
this function, and masters were appointed in Pennsylvania at least as early as 1720. See id.
at 598.
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78, 87 (Gil. 58, 61) (1860) ("[T]here is no such
officer as a referee permanently attached to a Court.").
75. See 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 374, 376 (Massachusetts); cf. Silberman, supra note 68, at
1106 (federal courts' use of magistrates).
76. See Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64.
77. See id. In 1976, the Hennepin County Special Term Referee heard 7857 matters,
broken down into the following categories:
I. Action Resulting in Disposal of Cases:
1890 Marriage Dissolutions without Childrena
1241 Entries of Judgments in Civil Mattersb
383 Change of Name Petitions
149 Transfers from District Court to Municipal Court
296 Tax Appeals Settled or Dismissed
191 Delinquent Trust Files Closede
4150 Subtotal
II. Formal Action on Civil Matters:
832 Uncontested Trustsd
317 Contested Matterse
1149 Subtotal
[Vol. 6
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss1/2
REFEREES IN MINNESOTA COURTS
carries with it the responsibility of advising pro se litigants on pro-
cedure, a practice corresponding to the chancery masters' role in
helping parties to select the appropriate writs. 78 Like the master's
relationship with the chancellor, the Special Term Referee makes
recommendations to the Special Term Judge rather than issuing
final orders.79 The present Special Term Referee estimates, how-
ever, that almost ninety-nine percent of his recommendations are
followed by the court.80 In this respect, the duties of the special
term referee also approximate those of the chancery master, who,
according to one authority, was neither a purely ministerial officer
nor did he really have any final determinative powers in judicial
matters. 8' The Special Term Referee's position, like that of his
predecessor, the standing master, is an ambiguous one. On paper,
he has no power at all, yet in practice it is obvious that he holds a
III. Non-Formal Action on Civil Matters:
1342 Miscellaneous Civil Mattersr
696 Delinquent Trusts Reviewed
513 Tax Pretrial Settlement Conferences
I Civil Pretrialg
6 Pre-Trust Hearings
2558 Subtotal
7857 Total
a. 550 with Change of Name
b. Includes Default Judgment Entered, Promissory Notes, Replevin Ac-
tions, Mechanics Liens, Mortgage Foreclosures, Quiet Title Actions,
etc.
c. By Termination or Discharge of Trustee
d. Approximately 4000 active trust files remained
e. Primarily Temporary Orders in Marriage Dissolutions
f. Includes Cases Continued, Stricken, Further Discovery, Bench War-
rants, Default Dissolutions, Advances, and other matters referred to
Special Term Referee
g. Contested Domestic Matter
T. Haeg, Special Term Referee: Annual Report of Judicial Business (Jan. 10, 1977) (on
file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Monthly reports from 1977 indicate a similar
volume and distribution of business. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas F. Haeg, Hennepin
County Special Term Referee, to Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, Hennepin County Dis-
trict Court (Nov. 7, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
Equity traditionally has exercised jurisdiction in marriage dissolutions, trust matters,
and actions for accounting. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Hill, 179 Ga. 417, 176 S.E. 381 (1934)
(trust matter); Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 11. 98, 113 N.E. 852 (1916) (marriage dissolu-
tion); Fair v. Stickney Farm Co., 35 Minn. 380, 29 N.W. 49 (1886) (accounting).
78. Compare Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64 (special term referee's
duties include advising pro se litigants) with Bryant, supra note 29, at 500 ("One of [the
chancery masters'] principal duties was to consider the proper writ for the people who
sought amelioration of the laws from the king.").
79. See Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64.
80. See id.
81. See Bryant, supra note 29, at 500.
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great deal. As will be seen below, this discrepancy exists to a
greater or lesser degree in all of the referee positions. It is one of
the central problems that will ultimately have to be resolved by
the Legislature.
B. Juvenile Court Referees
As with the development of the position of special term referee,
the history of referees in juvenile court also exhibits a persistent
tension between law and equity. Here it takes the form of conflict
between the equitable doctrine of parens palrt'ae and the need to
protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
8 2
In England, where the king or queen was parens patriae, the par-
ent of the nation, the court of chancery's position as the "King's
conscience" carried with it the power to appoint guardians for
abandoned or neglected children.8 3 Theparenspatriae doctrine has
been severely criticized by American courts as inapplicable in
countries that are not monarchies.8 4  Nevertheless, American
courts have widely relied on the doctrine to serve as the foundation
of the referee's power to determine juvenile delinquency cases. 85
Colorado, the second state to create a juvenile court,8 6 followed
the chancery analogy by creating special chancery masters called
"masters of discipline" to hear juvenile cases.8 7 Officers designated
82. See, e.g., Evans, The Constitutional Rzghts ofJuvenies--or Parens Patriae v. Due Process,
4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 152, 152 (1966); Note, The Patens Patriae Theory and Its Eect on the
Constitutional Linits ofJuvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Prr. L. REV. 894, 907-11 (1966).
83. See, e.g., Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1821) (court took custody of
poet Percy Bysshe Shelley's children because father was immoral and an atheist);
Nicholas, Histo, Philosophy, and Procedures ofjuvenile Courts, I J. FAM. L. 151, 151-61 (1961).
84. Cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1967) (criticizing parens patrnie doctrine); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (parenspatriae doctrine has American consti-
tutional limitations).
85. See, e.g., Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 469, 187 N.W. 226, 226 (1922);
Kenney, The Juvenile Court.- Pioneer in Social Jurtprudence, 16 MARQ. L. REV. 184, 185
(1932); Nicholas, supra note 83, at 158, 160.
86. See Act of Apr. 28, 1909, ch. 158, 1909 Colo. Sess. Laws 339.
87. Id. (creating juvenile court "masters of discipline"); see Mack, The Juvenile Court,
23 HARV. L. REV. 107, 118 (1909). Illinois was the first state to create ajuvenile court. See
id. at 107.
In this early commentary, the author approved the practice of appointing masters, in
the same terms used by modern advocates of referees: "This [practice] may prove to be
the best solution of a difficult problem, combining as it does the possibility of a quick
disposition of the simpler cases in many sections of a large city or county, with a unity of
administration through the supervisory power of a single judge." Id. at 118.
For a study of present practice in Denver, where two full-time referees are "empow-
ered to hear any case or matter under the court's jurisdiction," see Hufnagel & Davidson,
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as chancery masters still hear juvenile cases in at least three
states,a8 while a large number of states employ juvenile court refer-
ees or similar quasi-judicial officers.89
In the Minnesota juvenile justice system, the struggle over what
sorts of authority could be given to quasi-judges goes back at least
a century. In 1870, legislation was passed which provided that a
child who "by reason of incorrigible or vicious conduct .. .has
rendered his or her control beyond the power of parent, guardian
or next friend" could, for the sake of his or her "morals and future
welfare," be committed to a reform school by a justice of the
peace.90 Although these justices were elected officials, they were
not required to be "learned in the law." 9' Moreover, the statute
did not provide a mechanism for review of their commitment or-
ders.
92
There must have been widespread opposition to the justices'
broad discretionary power over children, for, in 1883, the law was
amended to require that the justice submit a written report of evi-
dence to a district judge for review before the commitment could
become final.93 It is not hard to see in this amendment one of the
Children in Need Observations of tractices of the Denver Juventle Court, 51 DEN. L.J. 337, 344
(1974). See also Gough, Referees in Calfrna's]uven'le Courts: A Stud; in Sub-Judicial Adjudca-
iron, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 3 (1967) (examining California juvenile court referees).
88. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 913(b) (1974); NEv. REV. STAT. § 62.090 (1977);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
89. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A. 10 (West 1968) (judge of probate court
may designate a probation officer or county agent to act as referee); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4-12 (West 1952) (judge may appoint a probation officer or other suitable person to
act as referee); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-07 (1974) (judge may appoint one or more per-
sons to serve as referees). Seegenerall4y Administrative Office of the Courts, Issues and Rec-
ommendations on Implementation of the Judicial Article 462-78 (Oct. 1976)
(summarizing the law as of 1976 in all states).
90. Act of Mar. 3, 1870, ch. VII, § 3, 1870 Minn. Gen. Laws 7, 9 (repealed 1905).
91. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VI, § 8 provided for justices of the peace, without
specifying that they should possess any educational qualifications. On the other hand, the
1857 Minnesota Constitution provided that "[j]udges of the supreme court and the district
court shall be learned in the law." Id. § 6. This provision was retained in the Minnesota
Constitution of 1974. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
Justices of the peace were abolished by the Minnesota Legislature in 1977. See Act of
June 2, 1977, ch. 432, § 27, 1977 Minn. Laws 1147, 1161 (amending MINN. STAT. § 487.35
(1976)).
92. See Act of Mar. 3, 1870, ch. VII, § 3, 1870 Minn. Gen. Laws 7, 8-9 (repealed
1905). A mechanism for review was established in 1883. See note 93 i/a and accompany-
ing text.
93. See Act of Mar. 2, 1883, ch. 37, § 2, 1883 Minn. Gen. Laws 35, 35 (repealed 1905);
f In re Welfare of Fields, 285 Minn. 184, 172 N.W.2d 322 (1969) (referee's order not final
and not appealable until signed byjudge). The 1883 amendment, in addition to requiring
district court approval, also required corroboration by two witnesses of the fact that the
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enduring ironies in the field of juvenile justice.94 Supposedly, the
commitment was meant solely for the welfare of the child.95 Nev-
ertheless, district court review was deemed necessary to protect
children from the possibility that the non-judges entrusted to de-
cide who needed moral betterment might make arbitrary deci-
sions.96
Despite the due process concerns embodied in the 1883 amend-
ment, by the end of the nineteenth century it was firmly estab-
lished that the state's parens patriae powers allowed the delegation
of judicial duties in juvenile cases.97 Although the act that estab-
lished Minnesota's juvenile courts in 1905, like the nation's first
juvenile court act,98 was an attempt to codify "ancient equitable
jurisdiction over infants," 99 the 1905 Act somehow omitted posi-
juvenile had committed an unlawful act before the juvenile could be committed by a
justice of the peace. See Act of Mar. 2, 1883, ch. 37, § 2, 1883 Minn. Gen. Laws 35, 35
(repealed 1905).
94. See genera4ly C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 309-70
(1978).
95. See Act of Mar. 3, 1870, ch. 7, § 3, 1870 Minn. Gen. Laws 7, 9 (repealed 1905). A
district court opinion quoted by the Minnesota Supreme Court provides a colorful exam-
ple of nineteenth century parenspatnae rhetoric. See State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn.
353, 354 (1892) ("It is the duty of the state in cases where evil courses have been entered
upon, to stretch forth its hand and rescue children from their evil surroundings ... 
(The case is reported at 52 N.W. 935 without the quoted language.).
96. See Act of Mar. 2, 1883, ch. 37, § 2, 1883 Minn. Gen. Laws 35, 35 (repealed 1905);
cf. State ex rel. Connolly v. Brown, 47 Minn. 472, 473-74, 50 N.W. 920, 920-21 (1891)
(granting writ of habeas corpus because, although signed by the district court judge, re-
port of justice of the peace omitted testimony ofjuvenile's witnesses). See also In re Welfare
of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 86, 244 N.W.2d 30, 38 (1976) (recognizing need for modern juve-
nile courts to furnish complete records of facts supporting adjudications), noted in 4 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 461 (1978).
97. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
The language of the constitution does not apply where the state acts as the com-
mon guardian of the community, exercising its power whenever the welfare of an
infant demands it, or where the state acts in the legitimate exercise of its police
power. Therefore the lawmakers were not prohibited from conferring jurisdic-
tion in such cases upon any of the judicial officers of the state.
State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 359, 52 N.W. 935, 936 (1892); cf. In re Adop-
tion of Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 422-23, 18 N.W.2d 147, 152 (1945) (parenspatriae doctrine
permits delegation of state function of protecting juveniles).
98. The nation's first juvenile court was established in Illinois by Act of Apr. 21, 1899,
1899 Ill. Laws 131. See Mack, supra note 87, at 107. Juvenile courts were established in
Minnesota by Act of Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, § 3, 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 419 (current
version at MINN. STAT. §§ 260.019-.024 (1978)). The Minnesota act closely followed the
original Illinois law. See Waite, New Lawsfor Minnesota Children, I MINN. L. REV. 48, 60-61
(1917).
99. People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, 415 I11. 135, 138, 112 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1953)
(construing Illinois law).
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tions for referees and masters.'°0 Juvenile court judges, however,
soon requested that referees be hired.' 0 More than half a century
later, the Committee on the Standard Juvenile Court Act recom-
mended the employment of referees in juvenile courts-though ap-
parently not without misgivings 0 2-- and Minnesota judges played
a leading role in bringing about the recommendation. 10 3 It was
asserted that by setting up a juvenile court with one judge and a
number of referees, it would be possible to adhere to consistent
policies. 0 4 In 1957, the Legislature enacted a bill allowing the
Hennepin County Juvenile Court to employ referees.'0 5 Two
years later the Legislature used the Standard Family Court Act as
a model for its authorization of referees for all Minnesota juvenile
courts. '
0 6
Among other things, the 1959 Act provides that "[tihe judge
may direct that any case or class of cases shall be heard in the .first
instance by the referee in the manner provided for the hearing of
cases by the court."'01 7 Thus there is no line of demarcation be-
tween the function ofjuvenile court judges and referees, other than
that drawn by an individual judge. In the Hennepin County Ju-
venile Court, until the 1978 law precluded referees from hearing
100. See Act of Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, 1905 Minn. Laws 418 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 260.011-.57 (1978)).
101. See, e.g., Waite, supra note 98, at 61. The author of this article was a juvenile court
judge. See id. at 62 n. 1.
102. See COMMITTEE ON THE STANDARD FAMILY COURT AcT, STANDARD FAMILY
COURT ACT § 7 (6th ed. 1959). "The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges has a
committee that is studying the question of the use of referees in juvenile and family courts.
It is considering, among other aspects, whether use of referees is a proper way of supplying
needed additional judicial manpower." Id. at 115, comment.
103. See, e.g., Arthur, The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 19 Juv. COURT JUDGES J. 153
(1969).
104. See id. at 156 (recognizing "the value of having a single judge with numerous
referees in order to obtain complete consistency of policy, of program, and of methodology
within the courts"). It should be noted, however, that some commentators question
whether uniformity is attained, and even question its validity as a goal. See, e.g., C. SIL-
BERMAN, supra note 94, at 345-46; Interview with William Kennedy, Hennepin County
Public Defender (Nov. 21, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office); Inter-
view with State Representative Gordon 0. Voss, supra note 7; Interview with State Sena-
tor Robert Tennessen, supra note 5.
105. See Act of Apr. 26, 1957, ch. 742, 1957 Minn. Laws 1006.
106. Compare COMMITTEE ON THE STANDARD FAMILY COURT ACT, supra note 102,
§ 7 with Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 685, § 5, 1959 Minn. Laws 1275, 1279-80 (authorizing
referees for all Minnesota juvenile courts) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 260.031
(1978)). See generaly UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 7.
107. Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 685, § 5(2), 1959 Minn. Laws 1275, 1279 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 260.031(2) (1978)).
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contested trials and motions to refer a juvenile for adult prosecu-
tion, the five full-time referees and one part-time referee heard
many of the same kinds of cases as the judge.10 8 In 1976, when
there were four full-time and three part-time Hennepin County
Juvenile Court referees, they heard the following matters:
Detention hearings: 2100 (97% of such matters heard)
Arraignments: 2600 (95%)
Adult references: 1 (1%)
Pre-arraignments/
Omnibus: 410 (95%)
Default trials: 180 (98%)
Contested trials: 340 (85%)
Dispositions: 3800 (90%)
Adoptions: 740 (98%)
Traffic: 4500 (100%)'09
In short, of the nine kinds of hearings in the repertoire of the court,
the Hennepin County Juvenile Court referees handled the vast
majority of cases in eight categories, leaving only references for
adult prosecution as the near-exclusive preserve of the judge.
Until the 1978 law took effect, Ramsey County Juvenile Court
referees heard all juvenile traffic matters, nearly all delinquency
hearings and trials, and occasionally heard neglect or termination
of parental rights cases." 0 The two full-time referees and one part-
time referee heard 12,163 delinquency matters, 5,878 traffic
cases-of which 266 were contested-and 32 boat or snowmobile
traffic cases in Ramsey County during 1976."' Statistics on the
use of referees in juvenile matters in the non-metropolitan counties
108. See Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur & Referee Patricia Belois, Hennepin
County Juvenile Court (Oct. 28, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
Similarly, hearings conducted in Hennepin County reveal that referees hold court in a
style indistinguishable from judges, use the same court rooms, wear robes, and are ad-
dressed as "your Honor."
Juvenile court referees are now forbidden, however, to hear any contested trial or
motion. See MINN. STAT. § 484.70(3) (1978). In 1979 this provision was amended to al-
low referees in the Second Judicial District to hear contested cases if no objection is made.
See Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 318, § 1, 1979 Minn. Laws 831, 831.
109. See Letter from Judge Bruce C. Stone, Hennepin County District Court, to Mem-
bers of Committee on Referees (July 7, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review
office).
110. See Interview with Referee Kenneth M. Truax, Ramsey County Juvenile Court
(Nov. 23, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
111. Interview with Clerk of Court, Ramsey County Juvenile Court (Dec. 1, 1977).
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are not presently available.'" 2
During the same period in which referees have been absorbing
the bulk of juvenile court duties in Minnesota, there has been a
continuing debate over what constitutes due process of law in juve-
nile court adjudications. In re Gaul/,"13 a United States Supreme
Court decision, required that juvenile courts conform their proce-
dures to those guaranteed adults by the Bill of Rights in a number
of important respects."14 Speaking through Justice Fortas, the
Court also attacked the basic doctrine ofparenspatriae in scathing
terms." 5 The experience of many states since Gault has been that
specific procedural reforms-right to notice of charges, right to
present evidence, and right to counsel--come easier than the fun-
damental changes of attitude the Gault Court urged in dicta." 6 In
Minnesota, where notification of charges and right to counsel were
required by state supreme court decisions long before Gault,' 17 the
parens patriae philosophy has continued to have strong adher-
ents. "8 One has a sense that there is an uneasy truce between
those critics of the juvenile court system who would give children
112. For the county courts' use of probation officers as referees in juvenile traffic cases,
see Note, Basti Rights for Juvenles in Juvenile Proceedings Under the Minnesota Juvenle Court
Rules.- A Response to Gault, 54 MINN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1969).
113. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
114. See id. at 34, 42, 57 (right to notice of charges, right to counsel, opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses). The Supreme Court has stopped short, however, of requiring
that juveniles be guaranteed the right to a jury trial. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
115. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) ("The Latin phrase [parenspatrzael proved to
be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the
constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance. ").
116. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 94, at 312.
117. See State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 248, 82 N.W.2d 234, 236
(1957); Act ofJuly 16, 1937, ch. 79, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 138, 138-39 (repealed
1959). See generally Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Study Comm'n, Report to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court, app. A, at 98-109 (1976).
118. See, e.g., Loyd v. Youth Conservation Comm'n, 287 Minn. 12, 17, 177 N.W.2d
555, 558 (1970) ("The Minnesota youth correctional system is grounded in the philosophy
of parens patriae, namely that the state has the inherent power to take such steps as are
necessary for the protection and welfare of the child."); cf. Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151
Minn. 467, 470, 187 N.W. 226, 226 (1922) (pre-Gault case; language similar to Loyd).
To develop a sense for the potential clash of purposes in the juvenile court system,
compare Loyd v. Youth Conservation Comm'n, 287 Minn. 12, 17, 177 N.W.2d 555, 558
(1970) and Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 469, 187 N.W. 226, 226 (1922) with
J.E.C. v. State, 302 Minn. 387, 401, 225 N.W.2d 245, 254 (1975) ("the whole purpose of
the Juvenile Court Act is to rehabilitate a young person before he or she becomes a men-
ace to society"). The critical area is that in which the welfare of the individual child
diverges from the interest in the protection of society.
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all the rights of adults, and those who would prefer to return to the
pre-Gault era when a benevolent despotism over the young was ac-
cepted as "in their best interests."
The present position of the juvenile court referees is in the no-
man's-land between the two camps. On the one hand, it is their
presence in the court system that enables the courts to provide the
many hearings required to make the Bill of Rights a reality for
juveniles. On the other hand, the fact that most juvenile contacts
with the courts are presided over by these non-elected quasi-judges
raises new questions.
The most serious due process objection to the use of referees in
Minnesota juvenile courts is that they are not required to be law-
yers. 119 The role of lay judges in handling adult misdemeanors has
received considerable criticism in recent years. 120 Minnesota's so-
lution has been to give these adult defendants convicted by non-
lawyer judges the right to a trial de novo before a judge "learned
in the law.' 12 ' Similarly, in the juvenile system, a child has a cor-
responding right to a rehearing before a judge.122 Given the in-
creasing complexity of juvenile law it is questionable whether a
rehearing is an adequate remedy. There is considerable support
for the view that if juvenile court referees are to be retained at all,
they should be lawyers.
23
A more fundamental problem stemming from the present sys-
tem is whether a rehearing by a judge of a referee's decision that a
child is not delinquent subjects the juvenile to double jeopardy.
24
119. See MINN. STAT. § 260.031(1) (1978) (referee must be "suitable" person, qualified
by "previous training and experience").
120. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to a Legally TrainedJudge: Gordon v. Justice Court,
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 739 (1975); Note, Gordon a Justice Court. Defendant's Right to a
Competent Tribunal, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1177 (1975); 25 U. KAN. L. REV. 275 (1977).
121. See State v. Lindgren, 306 Minn. 133, 135, 235 N.W.2d 379, 381 (1975) (per
curiam).
122. See MINN. STAT. § 260.031(4) (1978) (right to rehearing by judge available after
referee makes findings). This rehearing is available regardless of whether the referee is
learned in the law. See id.
123. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS
105-06 (1966); Piersma, Ganousis & Kramer, The Juvenile Court: Current Problems, Legirlative
Proposals, anda Mode/Act, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 11 (1975). A complicating factor is that
non-lawyer referees in Hennepin County have a great deal of experience, social service
training, and job dedication-things that are not taught in law school. See Interview with
Judge Lindsay G. Arthur & Referee Patricia Belois, supra note 108.
124. See, e.g., Jesse W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 893, 899, 576 P.2d 963, 967, 145
Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (rehearing after referee finding of nondelinquency constitutes double jeop-
ardy), vacated, 439 U.S. 922 (1978); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (trial of
juvenile as adult, after juvenile court finding of delinquency, constitutes double jeopardy).
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For the moment this question has been put to rest by In re Wefare of
C WS., 125 the Minnesota Supreme Court decision holding that the
double jeopardy issue does not have to be reached because Minne-
sota's statute precludes the state from requesting a rehearing on an
adverse finding by a referee.' 2 6 In other jurisdictions, the double
jeopardy issue has been squarely met. It has generally been deter-
mined that a referee's adjudication of delinquency or nondelin-
quency is a subjection to jeopardy, even if the resulting order is
subject to review.
127
Of the recent double jeopardy cases, it is probably the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Swisher v. Brady 128 that raises
the most interesting questions about the role of referees in the juve-
nile justice system. Swisher held that the Maryland procedure of
making a juvenile defendant go through the process a second time
after winning an advisory finding of nondelinquency from a juve-
nile court master did not constitute double jeopardy. 29 Speaking
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger explained that, although
jeopardy does attach when a matter is heard before a juvenile
court master, it is a continuing jeopardy that persists until the
judge signs an order.13° There is no double jeopardy because the
child is subjected to one long jeopardy before two fact-finders, not
two separate adjudications.' 31 Chief Justice Burger explicitly
bases this view on the idea that juvenile court masters "serve only
as ministerial assistants to judges,' 32 a conclusion stemming from
their inability to enter binding judgments. 33
That this interpretation exalts form over substance is argued in
dissent by Justice Marshall, Justices Brennan and Powell concur-
125. 267 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978).
126. Set id. at 498-99; cf. Jesse W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 893, 899 n.5, 576 P.2d
963, 967 n.5, 145 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 n.5 (same result in California), vacated, 439 U.S. 922
(1978).
127. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1975); Jesse W. v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 893, 576 P.2d 963, 145 Cal. Rptr. 1, vacated, 439 U.S. 922 (1978). Contra,
Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). Se also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 534 (1975)
(double -jeopardy issue in case involving retrial as adult after juvenile court finding of
delinquency).
128. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
129. See id. at 219.
130. See id. at 215-16.
131. See id. at 208 (quoting In re Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 47, 315 A.2d 540, 549
(1974)).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 208-09.
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ring. 3 4 Justice Marshall sees the judge-master relationship not as
that of judge and ministerial assistant, but as that of "a trial judge
and an appellate court with unusually broad powers of review."' 135
Thus, in his view, the Maryland arrangement violates the double
jeopardy clause.136 He says, in effect, the state is given a chance to
appeal from a judgment of acquittal.
137
Minnesota's juvenile justice system would not violate the double
jeopardy clause even under Justice Marshall's standard. 38  The
one suggestion by Justice Marshall that may foreshadow constitu-
tional problems in Minnesota is that the use of referees or masters
must be carefully tailored to avoid conflict with the due process
clause. 139 Here, the concern is that it may be inappropriate for a
judge who has not personally taken testimony and evaluated the
credibility of witnesses to enter a binding judgment based on an-
other person's findings. 140 The only solution Justice Marshall can
envision for this difficulty is that masters and referees be empow-
ered to enter binding judgments. 14 1 To do so, of course, would
destroy the referee system and make complete nonsense of Chief
Justice Burger's view that referees are simply "ministerial" em-
ployees. In short, while the Swisher majority has momentarily pro-
vided the referees a safe harbor from constitutional storms, there is
massive due process litigation on the horizon.
By precluding the state from requesting a rehearing, Minne-
sota's statute avoids any unfairness that might result from compel-
ling a juvenile defendant to go through the process a second time
after winning an advisory finding of nondelinquency from a ref-
eree.142 For juveniles who lose their delinquency hearings before
referees, however, it may be unfair to inflict emotional hardship by
134. See id. at 219 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 222 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 219 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Compare id. at 219 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reversal of master's finding of nonde-
linquency violates prohibition against double jeopardy) with In re Welfare of C.W.S., 267
N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn. 1978) (double jeopardy issue not reached because statute pre-
cludes review of referee finding of nondelinquency) and MINN. STAT. § 260.031(4) (1978)
(authorizing juvenile defendant, not state, to seek review of referee's findings).
139. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. at 229-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. See ia. at 232-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. See In re Welfare of C.W.S., 267 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Minn. 1978) (construing MINN.
STAT. § 260.031(4) (1978)); cf. Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (D. Md. 1977)
(discussing anxiety, insecurity, and personal strain on juvenile subjected to rehearing),
rev'd, 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
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forcing them to request rehearings before the juvenile court judge.
Some such consideration must have prompted the Legislature to
enact a section in the 1978 law that withdraws from juvenile court
referees the power to hear contested trials. 143 Currently there are
two bills before the Legislature that would restore this power to
the referees in all cases in which the parties fail to object. 144 In
keeping with the spirit of the 1978 legislation, which was aimed at
curtailing the most questionable duties of the referees pending fur-
ther study, these bills should be defeated.145
C Family Court Referees
Family courts are a relatively recent development in American
law. Because they were conceived as a hybrid of courts and social
service agencies, their historical roots are more complex than those
of juvenile courts. 146 In 1951, Minnesota judges and lawyers be-
gan to study the feasibility of special handling for divorces involv-
ing children. 147 Eight years later, the Family Court Division of the
Hennepin County District Court became the first American family
court to be created by court rule. 148 The 1967 Legislature recog-
nized this development by a statute creating a similar family court
division for Ramsey County. 1
9
143. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 484.70(3) (1976)).
In 1979, the Legislature amended MINN. STAT. § 484.70 (1978) by adding subdivi-
sion 4. This subdivision allows referees in the Second Judicial District to hear a contested
case unless either party or his attorney objects. See Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 318, § 1, 1979
Minn. Laws 831, 831 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 484.70(4) (Supp. 1979)). This provision
expired on March 1, 1980. See id. § 3, 1979 Minn. Laws at 832.
144. See S.F. 392, 71st Minn. Legis., 1979 Sess.; H.F. 263, 71st Minn. Legis., 1979 Sess.
145. S.F. 392 died after being referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See MINN.
S. JOUR. 169 (1979). H.F. 263 died after reference to the House Judiciary Committee. See
MINN. H.R. JOUR. 143 (1979).
146. See Arthur, A Family Court-Why Not?, 51 MINN. L. REv. 223, 224-26 (1966);
Gordon, The Fam'y Court- When Propero Defined, It is Both Desirable and Attainable, 14 J.
FAM. L. 1, 3-4 (1975). See generally Alexander, The Famiy Court-An Obstacle Race, 19 U.
PiTr. L. REv. 602 (1958); Alexander, Family Cases are Different-Why not Fami Courts?, 3
U. KAN. L. REV. 26 (1954); Dyson & Dyson, Famil Courts in the Unied States, 8 J. FAM. L.
505, 507-09 (1968); Pound, The Place of the Family Court in the Judicial System, 5 NAT'L PRO-
BATION & PAROLE A.J. 161 (1959).
147. See McVeety, Problems in Divorce Where Children are Concerned Lead to Establishment of
a Domestic Relations Court, HENNEPIN LAw., Feb. 1959, at 67.
148. See Knudson, Family Court-One Year Later, BENCH & B., Apr. 1960, at 38; D.
McLean, supra note 3, at 9.
149. See Act of May 31, 1967, ch. 22, §§ 2-6, 1967 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 2088, 2089-90
(current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 484.64-.65 (1978)). In Ramsey County, a district court
judge is appointed as family court judge for a one-year term, while in Hennepin County, a
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The family court has often been described as being like a court
of equity because, in the words of Roscoe Pound, "a court of eq-
uity can deal with a complicated situation for a protracted period
and keep a proceeding alive so long as its supervisory powers were
[sic] called for to do complete justice."IS A corollary of this view
is that "reference to masters who take evidence, make findings,
and make reports . . .should be used in the disposition of the
many-sided situations which may develop in the affairs of a fam-
ily."
5
Although the first full-time Minnesota family court referees
were appointed under the "inherent powers" of the court, 152 their
use "to assist said judge" was authorized by the 1967 Legisla-
ture. 53 The 1977 legislative session-the same session that abol-
ished refereest 54-also provided a domestic relations referee for St.
Louis County.
155
The duties of all family court referees include the handling of
default marriage dissolution cases, 156 but their other functions vary
from court to court. Ramsey County, for example, specifies by
court rule that referees will hear custody motions. 5 7 In Hennepin
County, the policy of former Family Court Judge Robert E.
Bowen was that there should be a "qualitative difference" between
what referees and judges hear. 158  Consequently, he believed that
referees should conduct fact-finding hearings and write temporary
orders, subject to review, in cases that would ultimately be decided
judge is similarly appointed for a term not to exceed two years. Compare MINN. STAT.
§ 484.64(1) (1978) (Ramsey County) with id. § 484.65(1) (Hennepin County). In the rest
of the state, county courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts in domestic
relations matters. See MINN. STAT. § 487.19(1) (1978).
150. Pound, supra note 146, at 168. This may have a parallel in the juvenile justice
field, where cases are monitored after court disposition.
151. Id. at 164; see COMMITTEE ON THE STANDARD FAMILY COURT ACT, supra note
102, § 7 (authorizing referees in family court).
152. See D. McLean, supra note 3, at 13.
153. Act of May 31, 1967, ch. 22, §§ 2-6, 1967 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 2088, 2089-90
(current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 484.64-.65 (1978)).
154. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
155. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 341, 1977 Minn. Laws 695 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 484.67 (1978)).
156. See MINN. STAT. § 518.13(4) (1978) (authorizing reference in default marriage
dissolutions).
157. See MINN. SPEC. R.P. DIST. CT., 2D DIST. 17 (1.06).
158. See Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, Hennepin County Municipal Court
(former Judge of Family Court) (Oct. 28, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review
office).
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by the court. 159 The statute creating the St. Louis County referee
position puts broad limits on the referee's duties, leaving the court
considerable flexibility.,60
Judge Lindsay G. Arthur has classified the problems handled by
the family court into three groups: family estrangement, child
care, and financial allocation matters. 16' These categories provide
a convenient structure for a closer view of the origins of the family
court referees and their duties.
Z Family Estrangement.- The Default Marriage Dissolution
In medieval England, the power to grant divorces lay in the ec-
clesiastical courts. 62 After Henry VIII broke with the Catholic
Church over the issue of divorce, divorce decrees were granted by
special acts of Parliament. 163 Many American legislatures were
uncomfortable with this power and turned it over to courts of eq-
uity.164 Some of these courts then appointed referees or masters to
hear divorce cases.
165
Minnesota inherited its earliest judicial views of divorce from
the ecclesiastical courts, 166 and, like England, went through a pe-
riod when divorces were granted by the Legislature.167 This prac-
tice ended in 1852 when Governor Ramsey started vetoing divorce
159. See id.
160. See MINN. STAT. § 484.67(2)(a) (1978) (referee empowered to "[h]ear and report
all matters involving dissolution of marriage, annulment, or legal separation, including
proceedings for civil contempt for violation of orders issued in the proceedings, and recip-
rocal enforcement of support actions . . . .'). The referee's power is, however, clearly
limited to making recommendations. See id. § 484.67(2)(b), (3)-(4).
161. See Arthur, supra note 146, at 229-30.
162. See, e.g., True v. True, 6 Minn. 458, 463 (Gil. 315, 319) (1861).
163. See R. GARRITY, MINNESOTA DIVORCE LAW 3-4 (1972).
164. See G. IRELAND & J. DE GALINDEZ, DIVORCE IN THE AMERICAS 1 (1947).
165. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 18 Minn. 90, 94-95 (Gil. 72, 77) (1871). Butcf. Madden
v. Madden, 44 Hawaii 442, 444, 355 P.2d 33, 36 (1960) ("a divorce judge lacks the power
of an equity court to delegate powers to a master in chancery"); Gomes v. Gomes, 26
Hawaii 128, 130 (1921) (authority cannot be delegated to master in divorce proceeding).
Besides Minnesota, 12 other states specifically provide for family court referees. See NAT'L
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PARAJUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN TODAY'S COURT SYSTEM
13-16 (1976).
166. See, e.g., True v. True, 6 Minn. 458, 464 (Gil. 315, 320) (1861) ("We have pointed
out the radical difference between the marriage contract and other civil contracts, which
we think is alone sufficient to authorize the court to adopt the principles of the canon law
concerning its dissolution.').
167. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 9, 1851, ch. XX, 1851 Minn. Terr. Sess. Laws 39 (dissolving
the marriage of Thomas and Mary Morton); R. GARRITY, supra note 163, at 5-6.
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bills. 68 After 1852, only courts granted divorces in Minnesota. 69
Whether they viewed this function as part of their equity jurisdic-
tion or as a common law power, however, remains unclear.
70
Whichever side of the court handled divorces, a default proceeding
that could take place before referees was developed.' 7 1 The non-
defaulting party was required to prove sufficient facts to justify the
decree, but the proof could take place before a referee because the
action was uncontested.172 In a default proceeding, "[tjhere is no
issue of fact joined."
173
During 1976, Minnesota referees heard approximately 4500 de-
fault marriage dissolution cases, broken down by county as follows:
Hennepin: 2,134 (plus 105 contested)
174
Ramsey: 1,654175
St. Louis: 733 (may include some contested)
76
If these figures suggest a dramatic increase in the volume of de-
168. See R. GARRITY, supra note 163, at 7-8.
169. Cf MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV, § 28 (denying Minnesota Legislature the
power to grant divorces).
170. Compare MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 66, § 13'(1851) (providing for trial by jury
in divorce proceedings) (repealed 1866) and id. § 14 (procedure same "as in the trial of a
civil action, unless the complaint be filed in the equity side of the court") (repealed 1866)
with Berkey v. Judd, 14 Minn. 394, 398 (Gil. 300, 302) (1869) (dictum) ("The actions
mentioned in Sec. 198, are all, except that for divorce, what were formerly known as ac-
tions at law. ... ) and Atwood v. Atwood, 229 Minn. 333, 336, 39 N.W.2d 103, 105
(1949) (dictum) (court has equitable jurisdiction in divorce proceedings).
171. See Young v. Young, 18 Minn. 90, 95 (Gil. 72, 77) (1871) (acknowledging practice
of reference for hearing in default divorce action); MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 66, § 165
(1851) ("[P]laintiff may upon . . . default, apply to the court .. .for the relief demanded
... If the .. .proof of any fact is necessary to enable the court to give judgment .. .
the court . ..may in its discretion order a reference for that purpose.") (emphasis added) (re-
pealed 1905). In default divorces, the complaining party was required to prove facts suffi-
cient to justify a decree of divorce. See True v. True, 6 Minn. 458, 464-65 (Gil. 315, 321-
22) (1861).
172. See authorities cited in note 171 supra.
173. Young v. Young, 18 Minn. 90, 95 (Gil. 72, 77) (1871) (emphasis in original).
174. Statistics as to Hearings in Hennepin County Family Court, Trial Calendar
Before Family Court Judge and Referee (1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review
office). In 1977, Judge Bowen no longer allowed contested divorces to be heard by refer-
ees. See Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158. Similarly, referees are
now prohibited by statute from hearing contested matters in family court, if either party
objects to the reference. See MINN. STAT. § 484.70(2) (1978).
175. Statistical Data-Ramsey County District Court: Family Court Division (1977)
(on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
176. Referee's Report: District Court, Family Court Division, St. Louis County (1977)
(on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
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fault divorces since 1871,'" 7 when the Minnesota Supreme Court
first approved the use of referees to hear such cases, the rationale
for permitting the practice has remained the same. A more "min-
isterial" referee function than supervising the proof of uncontested
facts would be hard to imagine. To the extent that the family
court referees hold specialized skill in the handling of delicate in-
trafamily problems, their employment in default hearings may be
a waste of talent. One might ask why uncontested dissolutions are
not simply heard by the clerk of court.
Certainly the use of referees to hear these proceedings raises no
due process problems. Even some of the legislators who have been
most critical of the referee system see no serious problems in using
referees to handle default dissolutions. 178 Accordingly, the 1978
Legislature imposed limitations on family court referees that apply
only to contested matters.
179
2. Child Care: The Custody Decisions
The allocation of child custody has clearly absorbed some of the
parenspatriae doctrine from the juvenile justice field. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court ruled in 1861 that the child custody aspect of
divorce "is the special province of a court of equity."'180 The view
that custody determination is an equity power also applies to sepa-
rate maintenance actions that do not involve marriage dissolu-
tion.' 8 '
Minnesota's marriage dissolution statute provides for custody
determination at three stages of the proceeding. An order to set
custody rights during the process of litigation is the first step.
82
177. In 1871 the Minnesota Supreme Court first approved the use of referees to hear
default divorce matters. See Young v. Young, 18 Minn. 90, 95 (Gil. 72, 77) (1871). In-
creased volume of family court matters justified the use of referees, according to a 1976
opinion. See Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 305, 242 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976) ("[Tlhe
necessity for the routine use of family court referees is plainly the ever-increasing volume
and complexity of domestic relations litigation. We take judicial notice of the impossibil-
ity of a single family court judge in a metropolitan area handling this burden without
assistance."); cf. Interview with G.A. Hatfield, supra note 34 (Three new judges would be
needed to replace the referees in Ramsey County Family Court.).
178. See, e.g., Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5.
179. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 484.70(2) (1976)).
180. True v. True, 6 Minn. 458, 467 (Gil. 315, 324) (1861).
181. See Atwood v. Atwood, 229 Minn. 333, 336 & n.3, 39 N.W.2d 103, 105 & n.2
(1949).
182. See Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 259, § 11, 1979 Minn. Laws 557, 561 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 518.131 (Supp. 1979)).
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The court's dissolution judgment contains a second order. 8 3 Fi-
nally, if the circumstances of the parties and their children change,
a revised order may be necessary. t8 4 Referees conduct at least
some of the initial custody hearings in all three metropolitan coun-
ties, t85 including contested cases when the parties are willing to
stipulate to proceeding before a referee. 86  In contested cases,
however, the referee's findings are merely advisory.
87
Whether the referees should be involved in child custody hear-
ings at all is a controversial issue. Hennepin County District
Court Chief Judge Eugene Minenko believes that the Hennepin
County referees are "well able to hear [motions for initial custody
orders] and make findings on them."'88 Other participants in the
court agree, stressing the importance of having custody decisions
made by someone with an interest in children and experience in
communicating with them. 89 This line of argument is a departure
from the traditional justification for referee powers which holds
that referees are merely assistants who free judges from some of the
mechanical drudgery of their courts. Rather, the advocates of
183. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2)-(3) (1978).
184. See id. § 518.18 (Supp. 1979). See also id. § 518.175 (1978 & Supp. 1979) (visita-
tion rights allowed at all stages).
185. During 1976 Hennepin County Family Court referees heard 4,896 motions for
relief, which include temporary custody motions and motions for custody studies, as well
as motions relating to support obligations. See Statistics as to Hearings in Hennepin
County Family Court, supra note 174. Referees in Ramsey County also make a similar
number of custody decisions. See Interview with Referee Gerald Alfveby, Ramsey County
Family Court (Oct. 26, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). The statis-
tics do not indicate, however, how many of these decisions are made, or at what stages of
the proceedings. In 1976 the St. Louis County referee heard 24 child custody matters. See
Referee's Report, supra note 176.
186. This practice is permitted by MINN. STAT. § 484.70(2) (1978). Referees are pro-
hibited from hearing contested family court trials only if a party or the attorney objects.
See id.
187. Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 304, 242 N.W.2d 88,93 (1976); see Rosenfeld
v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 78, 249 N.W.2d 168, 169 (1976) (affirming judge's power to
reverse referee's determination); LaBelle v. LaBelle, 296 Minn. 173, 176, 207 N.W.2d 291,
293 (1973) (judge has discretion to reverse referee).
Although MINN. R. Civ. P. 53.05(2) says, "the court shall accept the referee's findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous," the Peterson court held this rule to be inapplicable to
family court references. See Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. at 304, 242 N.W.2d at 93.
188. Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, Hennepin County District Court
(Nov. 4, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
189. See, e.g., D. McLean, supra note 3, at 46. Judge Sedgwick believes that the ability
to communicate with children is an important factor in making custody decisions. See
Letter from Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 18. Although this consideration seems
obvious, it is seldom addressed by those critics who would abolish referees in family court
and replace them with rotating judges.
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child custody decision making by referees are arguing that, as
dedicated specialists, the referees do a better job than rotating
judges would do.
Critics of the use of referees point out that initial custody orders
are often hotly contested.190 Although under the 1978 law parties
can avoid referee involvement in custody matters if they choose to
be heard by a judge, the history of reference by stipulation suggests
that there may be subtle pressures to waive this right. 19 1 Also, the
initial referee order may in some sense set a precedent for the
court's final custody decision, even though the statute contem-
plates a much more thorough evaluation for the second order than
for the first.' 9 2 The result may be that undue emphasis is placed
upon the initial findings made by the referee.
In Hennepin County, the family court referees no longer con-
duct any hearings that result in final custody orders. As Judge
Bowen explained it, "the parties have an absolute right to be
heard by an elected judge. Even if the parties stipulate to trial by
referee, at some point the loser is going to say 'I wish I'd had a
judge.' 193 As with the juvenile court referees, there is a continu-
ing debate that points up the contradictions between advocates of
full-time expert decision making and the proponents of decision
making legitimated by the full range of formal constitutional guar-
antees. Although referees may have considerable expertise in fam-
ily court custody matters, opponents argue that their use is an
improper delegation of judicial power. 9 4
190. See Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5.
191. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text (noting that pressures might be put
upon parties to accept reference).
192. See Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5 (temporary or-
ders in family court set precedents for final orders); cf. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1978 &
Supp. 1979) (listing 14 factors to be considered in final custody orders).
193. Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158. The 1978 law, however,
permits family court referees to hear all matters in which the parties do not object. See
MINN. STAT. § 484.70(2) (1978). After more than one year of experience under this law,
Judge Bowen believes that parties are satisfied with trials conducted by referees. See Inter-
view with Judge Robert E. Bowen, Hennepin County Municipal Court (Nov. 15, 1979)
(on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). As a result, so long as parties have a right
to a judge trial if they do not want referees, he believes the system works well. See id.
194. Compare Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5 (opposing
use of referees in family court) with Interview with Judge Harold W. Schultz, Ramsey
County District Court (Nov. 2, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office)
(noting that family court referees have developed expertise over the past decade).
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3. Fnancz'al Allocation.: Property Settlement, Ahmony, and Child
Support
Most people would agree that family courts should help parties
who are dissolving a marriage to reach a financial settlement that
is "equitable."'' 95 This term may be used simply in its nontechni-
cal sense to meanfair or just,t96 but there are also several attributes
of awarding property, alimony, or support that reflect the tradi-
tion of courts of equity. First, marriage dissolution is an area of
the law in which the trial court has always had broad discretion-
ary powers.19 7 Second, a primary concern is providing for the wel-
fare of dependent children. 198 Third, the examination of long
accounts may be involved, t'9 and finally, lengthy supervision of
the parties may be necessary to ensure that the court's orders are
carried out.2°° A party who fails to abide by a support or alimony
order may be punished for contempt, like one who disobeys an
equitable injunction.
20 1
Thus, it is not surprising that referees are used to conduct hear-
ings in virtually all stages of property and support allocation.
20 2
195. Cf MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979) ("Upon a dissolution of a marriage ...
the court shall ... make ajust and equitable disposition of the marital property. .. ");
Letter from Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 18 (thousands of people engaged in a
divorce look to the court for an "equitable" financial disposition).
196. Compare WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 769 (1971) (de-
fining equitable as "fair to all concerned") (nontechnical definition) with Day, The Develop-
ment of the Family Court, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON FAMILY LAW 99 (1950) ("(Divorce] cases from the beginning were tried by courts of
equity, and paramount in importance was the division of community property.") (using
"equity" in its technical sense).
197. See, e.g., Cozik v. Cozik, 279 Minn. 91, 96, 155 N.W.2d 471, 475 (1968).
198. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 282 Minn. 190, 194, 163 N.W.2d 852, 856 (1968).
199. Judge Sedgwick stated that many of the cases decided by the family court judge
involve the determination of the value of close corporations, family stock holdings, and
real estate. See Interview with Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 61. Describing the
examination of accounts, Judge Schultz put it this way: "If you'd listen for a day, you'd
see the many decisions that aren't judgmental-who gets the pots and pans, and who gets
the dog." Interview with Judge Harold W. Schultz, supra note 194.
200. Cf note 150 supra and accompanying text (courts of equity have the ability to
engage in lengthy supervision).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 518.24 (1978) (punishment for contempt allowed for disobedi-
ence of court order to pay maintenance or support).
202. Minnesota's marriage dissolution statute specifically enumerates many of these
stages of property and support allocation. See id. § 518.131 (Supp. 1979) (temporary or-
ders); id. § 518.57 (1978) (child support); id. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979) (disposition of marital
property); id. § 518.62 (Supp. 1979) (temporary maintenance); id. § 518.64 (1978 & Supp.
1979) (modification of decrees and orders).
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The following table provides a rough idea of the extent of their
work in this area:
1976 Family Court Hearings Before Referees on Property, Alimony,
and Support
20 3
Hennepin Ramsey St. Louis
County County County
Paternity
(uncontested) 1,034 -
Temporary support 4 ,8 9 6 204 81 7205 288
Statutory support
actions 64 -
Welfare actions for support 2,867
Actions brought under Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act 1,091 152 74
Contempt 726 461
Attachments 30
Amendments 825 116206
Because the referees handle such a large volume of these
cases, 2 0 7 they develop consistent views as to what sorts of awards
are fair, given the ages of children involved, and their parents'
means and income-earning potential. 208 Undoubtedly, the referees
203. For the source of these figures, see Statistics as to Hearings in Hennepin County
Family Court, supra note 174 (Hennepin County); Statistical Data, supra note 175 (Ram-
sey County); Referee's Report, supra note 176 (St. Louis County).
204. This figure includes all motions, those relating to child custody as well as property
division, support, alimony, and amendments.
205. This figure may include some temporary custody motions.
206. This figure may also include some amendments of custody or visitation rights.
207. This volume is increasing. According to the Ramsey County Court Administra-
tor, a fourth referee is needed to provide coverage for contempt and support motions,
which are increasing rapidly. See Interview with G.A. Hatfield, supra note 34.
One of the main causes of this increase in volume is the Social Service Amendments
of 1974. These amendments require, as a condition to the continuation of certain federal
social service funding, that paternity actions be brought by local authorities. See Social
Service Amendments of 1974, § 101, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1976 & Supp. I 1977), as
amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. III, § 328, 92 Stat.
2549, 2679 (repealing 42 U.S.C. § 756(b)), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws; D. McLean, supra note 3, at 31; cf. Interview with Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick,
supra note 61 (eight to nine referee-days per week spent on welfare cases that must be
brought by county attorney to prevent cutting off funds).
208. According to Judge Sedgwick, the family court referees see literally hundreds of
people raising children on a given income and they consequently develop a feel for what is
reasonable. See Interview with Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 61.
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develop a valuable expertise from this specialized experience.
There is also, however, the theoretical possibility that hearing so
many similar cases could cause a referee to become stale or insensi-
tive to the individual problems of litigants.
20 9
The fact that referees serve at the pleasure of the judge also
tends to bring about a certain uniformity of decisions. 210 Judge
Bowen believes that this consistency helps encourage out-of-court
settlements because lawyers can predict the award in a given case
fairly well. 2' 1 On the other hand, a major study of the Hennepin
County Family Court concluded that "[a]s to uniformity and con-
sistency qualified judges are expected to apply the law, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court; accordingly, reasonable consistency
and uniformity may be expected in adjudication by judges.
' '212
Consistent decision making, therefore, might not be unique to
referees.
Perhaps referees should be restricted to hearing only motions for
temporary support and alimony. This was Judge Bowen's policy
209. See Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188 (referee expertise
carries with it the possibility of engendering callousness). But cf Letter from Judge Su-
sanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 18 (Although judges expect their positions on the bench to
entail a wide variety of duties and a prolonged stay in family court might result in their
becoming stale, referees take their jobs because of a special interest in family law and have
different career expectations than judges.). Judge Sedgwick's position is confirmed by
Hennepin County Family Court Referee Edward Dietrich. See Letter from Referee Ed-
ward P. Dietrich, Hennepin County Family Court, to John Stuart (Nov. 17, 1977) (on file
at William Mitchell Law Review office).
210. According to Dyson & Dyson, supra note 146, at 576:
Since referees have no tenure, the judge is free to dictate policies that must be
followed by all of them. By contrast, the senior judge [of the Hawaii Family
Court] noted, a court with five different independent judges often presents "five
different faces of justice to the average Mr. Citizen," who may be "more con-
cerned about uniform treatment in the amount of alimony awarded against him
than about his more abstract procedural rights."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting, in part, Senior Judge Gerald R. Corbett, First Circuit
Family Court of Hawaii). Judge Sedgwick's view is that, during her work with the family
court, uniformity resulted from a more collegial relationship than suggested by Dyson &
Dyson, supra. See Interview with Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 61 (groups met to
discuss problems and make things run more smoothly; the best solution to a problem was
used, whoever suggested it; citing the amendment of support orders to reflect inflation as
an example of uniform treatment). See generally MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978) (referees
may continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge); see also Arthur, supra note 146, at
230 (family court judges should not be subject to rotation); Paulsen,Juvenile Courts, Family
Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694, 702 (1966) (same).
211. See Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158.
212. Fuller & Solomon, Feasibility Study of an Integrated Family Court for the Dis-
trict Court of Hennepin County 15 (1976) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review of-
fice).
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in Hennepin County. 213 Such a policy would also conform to the
requirement of the 1978 law that family court referees may not
hear "any final trial" of a contested case.214 Even temporary or-
ders raise concern in the minds of some legislators, however, be-
cause people can be jailed for contempt if they do not comply with
these orders.2 15 The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that a
referee's findings are advisory, with only prima facie validity, as
applied to custody orders.2 16 More recently, the rule has been ex-
tended to cover property divisions as well.21 7 This holding indi-
cates that the court is concerned with the referees' role in sorting
out the finances of parties to defunct marriages and suggests that
standards for supervising their work in this area will continue to
evolve.
. Henneph Counoy Deputy Ttle Examthers
There was substantial doubt as to whether the two referee posi-
tions in the Hennepin County Title Examiner's office were abol-
ished by the 1977 Legislature. 218 If, however, future legislation
eliminates all positions designated as "referee," the deputy title ex-
aminers might be included for two reasons. First, the Hennepin
County Civil Service System classifies their positions as "Court
Referees. '2 19 Second, the statute authorizing hearings in land title
cases, in effect at the time referees were abolished, provided for
"referring the application to an examiner of titles who shall ....
213. See Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158. Referees must also
continue to aid in the enforcement of existing orders. See id.
214. See MINN. STAT. § 484.70(2) (1978) (if either party objects in writing).
215. See, e.g., Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5. Seegeneraly
MINN. STAT. § 518.24 (1978) (punishment for contempt allowed for disobedience to court
order to pay maintenance or support).
216. See Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 305-06, 242 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (1976).
217. See Berg v. Berg, 309 Minn. 281, 285, 244 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1976) (per curiam).
218. "Even if the referees are abolished, they [the two Hennepin County Deputy Title
Examiners] wouldn't lose their jobs because that isn't their main function." Minneapolis
Tribune, supra note 10, at 6A, col. 1 (quoting Richard W. Edblom, Hennepin County
Examiner of Titles); see id. (Deputy Title Examiners considered an exception to law abol-
ishing referees because their complex position requires very technical knowledge) (quoting
State Senator Robert Tennessen). This doubt may have been resolved by the 1978 Legis-
lature in favor of retaining the Deputy Title Examiners. See note 220 infia.
Abolition of referees also had a potential impact on the St. Louis County Examiner of
Titles. Like the Hennepin County counterparts, the person occupying this position also
conducts Torrens registration hearings, and hears other land title matters, such as quiet
title and partition actions on an occasional basis. See Letter from Robert C. Brown, supra
note 36.
219. See Letter from Richard W. Edblom, supra note 31.
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possess the same authority as is vested by law in referees appointed
by the district court. ' '220 In other words, the deputy title examin-
ers, although primarily occupied with research and advisory du-
ties, have the power to hear cases. 221 The rationale for investing
them with this authority seems to be that land title cases are com-
plex, require specialized knowledge, and would, if taken from the
referees, put an intolerable burden on the calendar of the special
term judge.222 For the present, however, title examiners are ex-
empt from the law abolishing referees. Title examiners are no
longer considered referees under a 1978 amendment to the title
examiner statute.
22 3
Title examiners have been hearing Torrens registration cases
since 1912.224 Most of the cases heard by referees fall into three
categories: defaults, 225 contested cases referred by stipulation,
226
220. Act'of Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 305, § 13, 1905 Minn. Laws 454, 459-60 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 508.13 (1978)); see id. § 19, 1905 Minn. Laws at 463 ("The court may
refer the case . . . to one of the examiners, as referee, to hear the parties and their evi-
dence, and make report thereon to the court.") (current version at MINN. STAT. § 508.20
(1978)). Amendments to the above statutes in 1978 removed the term "referee" to avoid
including them within the law which abolished referees. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750,
§§ 4-5, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 909 (amending MINN. STAT. §§ 508.13, .20 (1976)). See also
MINN. STAT. § 508.12 (1978) (deputy title examiners shall be competent attorneys).
221. See MINN. STAT. § 508.20 (1978) (authorizing reference to examiner of titles for
trial); Interview with Richard W. Edblom, Hennepin County Examiner of Titles (Nov. 21,
1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office); Letter from Robert C. Brown, supra
note 36 (St. Louis County).
222. See Minneapolis Tribune, supra note 10, at 6A, col. 1 (deputy title examiners oc-
cupy very complex position requiring highly technical knowledge) (quoting State Senator
Robert Tennessen); Letter from Richard W. Edblom, supra note 31 ("The use of Examin-
ers of Title as Referees in Hennepin County to hear Torrens cases is the most efficient
possible method for processing these matters . . . . Without Referees," the special term
judge would have to hear land registration matters "intermingled with other cases."). See
generally Sullivan, The Land Court Revisited, 10 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 269 (1975) (similar
procedure used in Massachusetts).
223. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, §§ 4-5, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 909 (amending
MINN. STAT. §§ 508.13, .20 (1976)).
224. See Report, District Court Referees in Hennepin County Examiner of Titles Of-
fice 1 (1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). The Legislature originally
authorized title examiners to hear land title cases in 1905. See Act of Apr. 19, 1905, ch.
305, §§ 13, 19, 1905 Minn. Laws 454, 459-60, 463 (current version at MINN. STAT.
508.13, .20 (1978)).
225. According to Examiner of Titles Richard W. Edblom:
A default Torrens case is one in which no answer has been filed . . . . [Ilt is
necessary to make sure all liens, easements and other rights noted in the Exam-
iner's Report are properly reflected in the Decree of Registration. The holders of
such interests invariably default in a Torrens proceeding but yet expect to have
their interests properly restated in the Decree of Registration.
Letter from Richard W. Edblom, supra note 31.
226. Well over 95% of the contested cases are heard by deputy title examiners by con-
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and contested cases subject to compulsory reference by the special
term judge.22 7 In 1977, the work of the Hennepin County referees
included 200 original registration proceedings, 400 proceedings
subsequent, 400 probate transfers, 70 trustees' deeds, 150 district
court decrees awarding real property, 200 lost owner's duplicate
certificates of title, and 300 directives to the Registrar of Titles. 228
Recently, this caseload has increased "with the advent of
townhouse developments and condominiums" and new forms of
trust agreements. 29 Because it appears that no one really has any
objection to the Torrens referees hearing these matters,2 30 and be-
cause the incumbent title examiners have built up a body of spe-
cialized knowledge that enables them to hear land title matters
efficiently, it seems these positions should continue to be exempted
from any wholesale removal of referees that may occur. 231
E. Henneprn County Administrative Hearing Oicers
Another position that could be affected by future legislation is
that of the administrative hearing officers who settle limited cate-
gories of traffic matters in Hennepin County.232 The two persons
presently in office were appointed by the Hennepin County Mu-
nicipal Court when it created the positions pursuant to its "inher-
ent powers" in 1971.233 Administrative hearing officers have the
power to suspend parking fines, accept guilty pleas to petty misde-
meanor moving violations, such as speeding, and arrange time-
payment plans for certain fines.234 They cannot, however, suspend
sent of the parties because the attorneys prefer to be heard by someone with a background
in real estate law. See Interview with Richard W. Edblom, supra note 221. It is also
cheaper for the parties to be heard before a deputy than to be heard on the special term
calendar. See id'.
227. These are so rare that the Hennepin County Examiner of Titles does not remem-
ber when the last one occurred. See Letter from Richard W. Edblom, supra note 31.
228. See Report, supra note 224, at 2.
229. See id. at 3.
230. See, e.g., Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5 (examiners
of title should continue as in the past); Interview with State Representative Gordon 0.
Voss, supra note 7 (excluding title examiners from list of referees over which Legislature
was concerned).
231. For the present, this already appears to have been accomplished. See note 223
supra and accompanying text.
232. Cf Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32 (describing role and function of
administrative hearing officers).
233. See id.
234. See id.
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a fine for any moving violation. 235 The more serious traffic of-
fenses, like careless driving, are handled exclusively by the munici-
pal court. 236 With respect to misdemeanors, the hearing officers do
not even have the authority to arrange for installment payment of
fines. 237  In 1976, 20,124 defendants appeared before these of-
ficers. 238 Although they are neither referees nor judicial officers,
239
their functions could be called quasi-judicial. At the very least, the
public and the Legislature should know enough about the admin-
istrative hearing officers to avoid eliminating these positions inad-
vertently.
There has been an academic debate going on for several years as
to whether or not it is appropriate and constitutional to handle
traffic offenses administratively. 24° The discussion revolves around
the extent to which a traffic violation is a crime. One position is
that even a parking violation is a criminal matter. As one legisla-
tor puts it, "parking tickets are court functions; these are criminal
things and they are court functions automatically. ' 24 1 Thus they
should be handled, he urges, by judges learned in the law.2 42 On
the other hand, there is a strong counterargument that because
traffic offenses are commonplace, generally carry no stigma, and
235. See id.
236. Reckless driving is a misdemeanor, see MINN. STAT. § 169.13(1) (1978), which
comes within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts. See id. § 488A.01(6)(a)(1) (Henne-
pin County Municipal Court); id. § 448A.18(7)(a)(l) (Ramsey County Municipal Court).
237. See Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32; cf State v. Hoben, 256 Minn.
436, 444, 98 N.W.2d 813, 819 (1959) (defendant entitled to jury trial for serious traffic
offense).
238. See Hennepin County Court 5 (1977).
239. See Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32 (hearing officers are considered
to be administrative, not judicial).
240. Many commentators have suggested that it may be desirable to handle some cate-
gories of traffic offenses administratively, so long as the due process rights of defendants
are guaranteed, and there is proper judicial supervision. See Force, Administrative Adjudia-
tion of Tra~fc Violations Confronts the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 49 TUL. L. REV. 84
(1974) (noting specific constitutional difficulties); Note, A Study of the Constitutionality of Lim-
iting Administrative Adjudication of Traft0 e ues to a Portion of the State, 33 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 301 (1966-1967) (same). See generally Berg & Samuels, Improving the Administration of
justie in Traf Court, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 503 (1970); Netherton, Fair Trial in Traftc Court,
41 MINN. L. REV. 577 (1957).
241. Interview with State Representative Gordon 0. Voss, supra note 7.
242. See id.; cf. ABA COMM. ON THE TRAFFIC COURT PROGRAM, STANDARDS FOR
TRAFFIC COURT JUSTICE § 2.0 (1975) (traffic offense decisions should be kept within the
judicial branch of government). See generally Carrow & Reese, State Problems of Mass Adjudi-
cative Justice." The Administrative Adjudication of Traft Violations-A Case Study, 28 AD. L.
REv. 223, 228-30 (1976) (surveying and discussing jurisdictions that characterize traffic
offenses as criminal acts and those that do not).
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require no criminal intent, they should not be regarded as
crimes. 243 The solution adopted by Hennepin County in allocat-
ing adjudicatory duties according to the seriousness of the offense
seems to be a reasonable compromise.
244
F Henneprn County Conczh'atz'on Court Referees
The Hennepin County Conciliation Court has jurisdiction in
civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed
$1,000.245 Although the 1977 legislation that removed referees
from certain enumerated courts did not include the conciliation
court, 24 6 this court does employ referees and could be affected by
subsequent legislation.
247
Conciliation court referees are employed on a per diem basis.
248
In 1977, 477 referee-days were authorized, at a total cost of
$31,500.249 If this figure seems high, it should be noted that, given
the county's need to make conciliation court services available in
the suburban "satellite courts," the alternative to the use of per
diem referees would probably have been the appointment of two
243. See, e.g., Note, Trafic Court Reform, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROB. 255, 256-58
(1968).
244. As Senator Tennessen explained, "The guilty plea for parking is uncontested. It
is a plea of guilty with a plea for mercy." Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen,
supra note 5. There is little doubt that the present procedure does make traffic justice
more accessible to the public than the prior traffic court system. See Hennepin County
Court 5 (1977). Moreover, it encourages consistency. See Note, supra note 243, at 263-64
("There should be a permanent staff of referees to preside over all hearings. Such an
approach would promote consistent treatment of traffic infractions."). Chief Judge Eu-
gene Minenko describes the existing program in Hennepin County as "excellent, a service
to the citizens." Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188.
245. See MINN. STAT. § 488A. 12(3) (1978).
246. The law that abolished referees, Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 432, § 48, 1977 Minn.
Laws 1147, 1168 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978)), only pertained to
"the position of referee in the county municipal and district courts .... ." Id. Thus, it
seems that conciliation court referees were excluded from the Legislature's abolition. See
Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32; cf. MINN. STAT. § 488A.12(2) (1978) ("The
conciliation court . . . . is separate from the municipal court of the county of Henne-
pin.").
247. Ramsey County Conciliation Court also employs referees-a practice that began
on August 1, 1979. See Interview with Ron Bushinski, Ramsey County Municipal Court
Administrator (Aug. 24, 1979) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Presuma-
bly, this Article's discussion of the Hennepin County Conciliation Court referees also is
applicable to those in Ramsey County. See generally note 35 supra.
248. See Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32; Letter from Jack M. Provo,
supra note 3.
249, See Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32.
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additional municipal court judges.2 50 One judge in the municipal
court system sees the employment of referees as an experiment that
has worked out "exceptionally well" in terms of low costs, low ap-
peal rates, and conservation of the time of municipal court
judges.2 5' Apparently, some of the referees also offer the advan-
tage of specialization, having received training in matters pertain-
ing to housing and real estate.2 52 Moreover, conflict of interest
problems-always a concern when a given individual is an advo-
cate one day and a quasi-judge the next-are avoided by requiring
the referees, as a condition of their employment, not to practice
before the conciliation court.
2 53
Like the administrative hearing officers and title examiners, the
conciliation court referees force critics of quasi-judges to face the
issue of how totally they want to purge the system of referees and
related positions. In a period of increasing concern over govern-
mental expenditures, these critics should confront what seems to
be an undisputed fact; conciliation court referees, like hearing of-
ficers and title examiners, are providing public access to the court
system with much more convenience and at a much lower cost
than an all-judge system.
G. Probate Court Referees
Although the positions of the four Hennepin County Probate
Court referees and the one Ramsey County Probate Court referee
were not abolished by the 1977 Legislature, 254 they, like the offi-
cials discussed in the three preceding sections, seem vulnerable to
future legislative action. Therefore, a brief outline of their duties
is included here to complete the picture of the work of referees in
Minnesota.
Referee positions in the probate courts were first authorized in
1929, with the requirement that they be filled by qualified attor-
250. See Letter from Jack M. Provo, supra note 3.
251. See Letter from Judge William B. Christensen, Hennepin County Municipal
Court, to Members of the Government Administrative Subcommittee of the House Gov-
ernmental Operations Committee (Oct. 11, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Re-
view office).
252. See Interview with Gordon Griller, supra note 32.
253. See id.
254. See Act of June 12, 1977, ch. 432, § 48, 1977 Minn. Laws 1147, 1168 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978)); c( note 246 supra and accompanying text
(discussing conciliation court referees).
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neys.2 55 Presently, it is in the discretion of the probate judge to
submit "any matter, cause, or proceeding" in probate court to a
referee. 2 6 The present judges of the probate courts agree that
their referees primarily do administrative work relating to estates
and guardianships.
2 57
In Hennepin County, one of the four probate court referees has
major responsibilities in the area of civil commitments. 258 Eventu-
ally, the current discussion of due process rights in the field of
mental health may create a controversy around this practice.
259
As one judge in Ramsey County noted, "[t]here should be a sensi-
ble way to allocate the work. Commissioners [Ramsey County's
equivalent of the Hennepin County civil commitment referee] are
committing people to mental hospitals for the rest of their lives
while I hear jury trials of careless driving cases.''26° The reason
behind the present practice is the sheer volume of commitment
hearings.2 6 1 Several legislators feel that as the discussion of Minne-
255. See Act of Apr. 22, 1929, ch. 271, § 1, 1929 Minn. Laws 331, 331 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 525.10 (1978)).
256. MINN. STAT. § 525.102 (1978).
257. See Interview with Judge Andrew Glenn, supra note 28; Interview with Judge
Melvin Peterson, Hennepin County Probate Court (Nov. 22, 1977) (on file at William
Mitchell Law Review office).
258. See Interview with Judge Melvin Peterson, supra note 257. In Ramsey County,
according to Judge Glenn, commitments are heard by a court commissioner appointed by
the county board. See Interview with Judge Andrew Glenn, supra note 28.
259. See Interview with Judge Melvin Peterson, supra note 257 (some critics are moving
to apply all criminal due process safeguards to civil commitment proceedings). See gener-
all Flaschner, The Role of the Court as Mental Health Laws Change, 62 ILL. B.J. 128 (1973);
Shlensky, Constitutional Problems with Mental Commitment in Illinois, 62 ILL. B.J. 552 (1974);
Zander, Civil Commitment in Wi constn: The Impact ofLessard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wis. L. REV.
503; Note, Involuntag Civil Commitments-How Heavy the Burden?, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 187
(1977); 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1977).
260. Interview with Judge Joseph P. Summers, Ramsey County District Court (Oct.
26, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). Judge Peterson of the Henne-
pin County Probate Court feels that the rights of mental patients are constitutionally
protected in eight distinct areas, and, while the present practice of using a referee under
his supervision presents no constitutional problems, he would prefer this work to be done
by a full-time judge. See Interview with Judge Melvin Peterson, supra note 257.
261. In Hennepin County during 1976, there were approximately 3300 approaches for
a commitment, leading to about 700 commitments. See Interview with Judge Melvin Pe-
terson, supra note 257. Hearings are held by the referee in the various hospitals involved.
See id.
According to Judge Minenko, "commitment proceedings in Hennepin County are
just horrendous in sheer numbers." Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra
note 188. He feels that it would be impossible to have the same due process protections in
this area as in criminal law. See id.
Judge Peterson's view is that not quite the same protection is required because many
alternatives are explored in each case before the commitment decision is reached, and
1980]
41
Stuart: Judicial Powers of Non-Judges: The Legitimacy of Referee Function
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
sota's referees continues, the commitment responsibilities of the
probate court referees should be examined in greater detail. 262 As
has been suggested with regard to juvenile court work, the spirit, if
not the letter, of the due process clause may entitle persons facing
involuntary commitment to be heard by an elected judge.
Most of the other duties performed by probate court referees
appear, however, to be fully justifiable under the same sort of poli-
cies that support the Hennepin County title examiner's office.
26 3
Nobody seems to object to the use of referee expertise in probate
administration.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY: JUDICIAL
REGULATION OF REFEREES
Because referees are appointed by the judges they serve and
serve at the pleasure of the judges rather than being subject to
election, 264 some critics have stated that they are not accountable
to the public.2 65 In some respects, this criticism is an oversimplifi-
cation. It is possible to prevent a referee from hearing a particular
case by filing a notice of removal.2 66 Serious or prolonged miscon-
duct or disability can lead to the removal of a referee by the Board
on Judicial Standards. 267 In addition, the public could express a
negative opinion of a referee by failing to reelect that referee's su-
pervising judge,268 but the realities of the political process make
because many avenues to release are available via a restoration hearing. See Interview
with Judge Melvin Peterson, supra note 257.
262. See, e.g., Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5; Interview
with State Representative Gordon 0. Voss, supra note 7.
263. Judge Glenn noted that the work was specialized and so close to a ministerial
level that, if the referee's job were to be done by an elected official, it would be hard for
the electorate to become sufficiently informed to make a meaningful voting decision. See
Interview with Judge Andrew Glenn, supra note 28.
264. See MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978).
265. See, e.g., Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5.
266. See Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64 (noting that only one affidavit
of prejudice has been filed against the Hennepin County Special Term Referee during the
first 14 months that this office has been in existence); cf MINN. R. CIv. P. 63 (procedure
for filing affidavit of prejudice against any judge before whom a motion or trial is sched-
uled for hearing).
267. See MINN. STAT. § 490.18 (1978) ("The provisions of sections 490.15 and 490.16
[creation and powers of Board on Judicial Standards] apply to all judges, judicial officers,
referees and justices of the peace."). Of the judges interviewed, Judge Gingold is the only
one who has ever removed a referee. See Interview with Judge Archie L. Gingold, Ramsey
County District Court (former Judge of Juvenile Court) (Nov. 2, 1977) (on file at William
Mitchell Law Review office).
268. According to Judge Sedgwick, "With respect to the fact that referees are not an-
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this an unlikely occurrence.2 69 Nevertheless, in practice, it is true
that the judge controls the referee.270 Accordingly, it becomes im-
portant to understand the channels, both formal and informal,
through which the trial judge exercises control over the referee,
and how decisions of the supreme court shape this control process.
A. The Weight of Referees' Fz~zigs
The findings and recommendations of the special term referee
and those of a family or juvenile court referee are given different
effects by law. The weight of the special term referee's findings is
governed by rule 53 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides two different standards.271 If a jury trial is in-
volved, the referee's report may be read to the jury as evidence,
subject to objection by the parties. 272 If trial is to the court, the
referee's findings of fact are accepted by the court unless they are
"clearly erroneous. "273 Of course, the litigants are always free to
stipulate that the referee's findings will be final, subject to appeal
only on points of law.
2 74
Rule 53 has limited application to family court proceedings.
swerable to the public in the same way as judges are, i.e., by the elective process, it seems
to me that the judge in charge of family court is responsible to the electorate and has the
responsibility to correct such personnel problems as may from time to time exist." Letter
from Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 18. Judge Arthur agrees: "The ballot says
'Judge of the Juvenile Court.' If the voters don't like how our system works, they can
change it every six years." Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108.
269. Many referees maintain a low level of public visibility. Judge Glenn notes that
the Ramsey County Probate Court referees perform largely ministerial functions which do
not receive much notice from the public. See Interview with Judge Andrew A. Glenn,
supra note 28.
270. Former ChiefJudge Ronald E. Hachey of Ramsey County District Court believes
that judges have more control over a referee than the public has, in practice, over a judge.
See Interview with Judge Ronald E. Hachey, supra note 3. As the Hennepin County Spe-
cial Term Referee explains, "I have 19 bosses here; if I'm not doing my job, I'm going to
hear about it." Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64.
271. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 53.05(2)-(3); Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64.
272. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 53.05(3). See generayll Copp v. Henniker, 55 N.H. 179
(1875).
273. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 53.05(2); cf. Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873
(7th Cir.) (holding "clearly erroneous" to be the proper standard for accepting the find-
ings of a master in federal court), cert. den'ed, 400 U.S. 1020 (1970). But cf. United States v.
Twin City Power Co., 248 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1957) (in federal court, "clearly erroneous"
standard merely a guide for trial judge). Seegeneraly Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla.
1956).
274. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 53.05(4). See generaly notes 54-57 supra and accompanying
text; see also Dundee Mortgage & Trust Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 124 U.S. 157 (1888).
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Furthermore, before the recent case of Peterson v. Peterson ,275 the
impact of the "clearly erroneous" standard was unclear. Peterson
cleared up some confusion surrounding the practical meaning of
"clearly erroneous" by holding that, in family court, "[t]he ref-
eree's recommended findings and order . . .will carry only such
weight and persuasive force as their merits demand .... ,,276 It is
possible that this standard applies to the juvenile court as well
277
because the statutes creating both family and juvenile courts pro-
vide that referees' orders are not final unless confirmed by the
judge.2
78
In a very large percentage of cases in all courts that employ
referees, however, referees' findings are adopted routinely.279 The
275. 308 Minn. 297, 242 N.W.2d 88 (1976).
276. Id. at 306, 242 N.W.2d at 94. In other words, MINN. R. Civ. P. 53.05 does not
establish the standard determining what effect should be given to referee findings in fam-
ily court. See 308 Minn. at 306, 242 N.W.2d at 94.
277. See In re Welfare of C.W.S., 267 N.W.2d 496, 499 n.I (Minn. 1978) (Peterson, J.,
dissenting) ("This view of the limited powers of juvenile court referees is consistent with
the limited powers of family court referees under analogous statutes."); cf. Peterson v.
Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 306, 242 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976) ("only findings of a trial judge
and referee appointed pursuant to Rule 53 are to be governed by the 'clearly erroneous'
standard").
278. Compare MINN. STAT. § 260.031(5) (1978) (juvenile court) with Id. § 484.65(9)
(family court). Parties in family court have ten days in which to request review of referee
findings, see id., but in juvenile court they have only three days. See id. § 260.031(4).
279. The extent of review given referee findings by the various judges might not always
measure up to the expectations of outside observers. According to Fuller & Solomon, supra
note 212, at 15:
[R]eviewing and signing referee's [sic] orders can easily consume significant judi-
cial time. Statistics from the juvenile court recorded an average of 300 orders
per month, or about 15 per court day. Since, by definition, the process of review
and signing referee orders is not a perfunctory act, it is estimated that this func-
tion should take about an hour of a judge's time daily.
None of the judges interviewed for the present study, however, thought that they
averaged five hours of review time per week. See notes 284-87, 296-99 infta and accompa-
nying text.
One commentator has criticized minimal judicial review of referee decisions as fol-
lows:
The requirement in many states that referee recommendations be reviewed by a
judge would place an impossible burden on the judge, were he or she to carefully
review each referee decision.
Accordingly, pro forma judicial approvals are common. A California dis-
trict court of appeals ruled that pro forma judicial ratification of referee recom-
mendations violated that state's constitutional provision banning commissioner
performance of other than 'subordinate judicial duties.' In effect, the referee was
functioning as a judge. . . . Judges may be unable to resist the temptation to
support their referee's findings in order to avoid rehearings that occupy more
time then they wish to allocate.
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT OR-
GANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 23 (§ 2.2 Commentary) (Tent. Draft 1977).
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Hennepin County Special Term Referee reports that the judge ac-
cepts ninety-eight or ninety-nine percent of his recommenda-
tions. 280 With respect to temporary orders, one of the Hennepin
County Family Court referees says, "we have a stamp; when the
judge sees our names, he signs it." ' 281 The former family court
judge states that he checked "all Findings, Conclusions, and Or-
ders of referees in default or stipulated cases," but this review pro-
cess was carried out while he was on the bench.282 He says that
reversals of the referees' decisions at this stage seldom occurred.
28 3
In Hennepin County Juvenile Court, the former juvenile court
judge did not spend "much time" going over daily decisions,
though periodically he did conduct thorough random checks.
284
In Ramsey County, the family court judge says that most rec-
ommendations are adopted and confirmed (signed by the judge)
without "review.28 5 The referees generally point out special cases
for more careful review by the judge.286 With respect to civil com-
mitments in Hennepin County, the probate judge states that the
referee "does the bulk of the commitments; under the present stat-
ute we have to make detailed findings. My review of those is to
look at the orders and the language he uses, and if they look al-
right I sign them. He's quite competent, and I really wouldn't
have the time to review all those files."
'287
It is important not to evaluate these relatively brief review pro-
cedures out of the context of the total relationship between judges
and referees in each court. For one thing, the cases heard by the
referees are usually pre-screened to make sure they do not present
difficult issues. 288 Second, the referees' decisions are guided by the
policies of their respective judges. 289 Third, when a problem does
280. See Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64.
281. Interview with Referee Daniels McLean, Hennepin County Family Court (Oct.
26, 1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
282. Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158.
283. See id.
284. See Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108.
285. See Interview with Judge Harold W. Schultz, supra note 194.
286. See id.
287. Interview with Judge Melvin Peterson, supra note 257.
288. See, e.g., Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108 (Judge of Hen-
nepin County Juvenile Court hears cases that present issues likely to be appealed); Inter-
view with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158 (Judge of Hennepin County Family
Court withdraws contested cases from referees); Interview with Judge Melvin Peterson,
supra note 257 (Hennepin County Probate Court has an extensive program of screening
cases before referee hearing).
289. See note 210 supra and accompanying text. The Ramsey County Probate Judge,
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come up in a given case, the referees consult their judges before
making findings and recommendations. 29 For all of these reasons,
referee decisions are not often appealed.
B. Appeals within the Specialized Courts
291
In the Hennepin and Ramsey County juvenile courts, one might
expect a large number of appeals of delinquency determinations
for several reasons. First, a finding that a child is a juvenile delin-
quent carries a social stigma.292 Such a finding can also result in
the institutionalization of the child involved.293 Finally, public de-
fenders are available to represent children who do appeal. 294 In
practice, however, such appeals are astonishingly rare. Judge Ar-
thur heard only twenty appeals in Hennepin County during
1976.295 These cases took up approximately one hour per week of
his time.296 Judge Gingold in Ramsey County states that the
number of appeals is not great.2 97 Reviewing orders and hearing
appeals, combined, took three to four hours of his time in an aver-
age week.2
98
Three to four hours per week is approximately the amount of
acknowledging frequent informal discussions with the referee, states: "I'm the boss; I set
the policy, and he carries it out." Interview with Judge Andrew Glenn, supra note 28. In
the Hennepin County Juvenile Court, referees follow written statements of court policy.
See Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108.
290. See, e.g., Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64 ("[I]f there's anything
unusual about a file, I bring it to [the judge's] attention."); Interview with Judge Melvin
Peterson, supra note 257 (In Hennepin County Probate Court, "if the [civil commitment]
case is contested [the referee] comes back and we discuss the evidence."); Interview with
Judge Harold W. Schultz, supra note 194 (In Ramsey County Family Court, referees indi-
cate to the judge which cases are troublesome,. so the judge can read them carefully.).
291. This area of the present study considers only the Hennepin and Ramsey County
family and juvenile courts. It should be noted, however, that "less than two percent" of
all conciliation court actions in Hennepin County are appealed. Letter from Judge
William B. Christensen, supra note 251. In the field of civil commitments, Judge Glenn of
the Ramsey County Probate Court notes that appeals are rare, in part because "it is easier
to get a restoration hearing." Interview with Judge Andrew Glenn, supra note 28.
292. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975).
293. See id.
294. As Judge Arthur says, "[Hennepin County has] 13 juvenile public defenders who
do not hesitate to appeal from referee to judge." Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur,
supra note 108.
295. See Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108. These are appeals
on the record, not trials de novo. Id.
296. See id.
297. See Interview with Judge Archie L. Gingold, supra note 267.
298. See id. Occasionally there is a trial de novo before the judge. When that occurs,
substantially more time is required.
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time that the Hennepin County Family Court judge spends on ap-
peals as well, according to Judge Bowen.299 He estimates that he
affirmed seventy to eighty percent of the referees' decisions in these
cases, explaining that "I'm trying to draw the line, based on the
Peterson case,. . . between 'clearly erroneous' and second guessing.
In other words, I try to give the referees some credit. ' ' 3°° In the
Ramsey County Family Court, there are "maybe eight or ten" ap-
peals per year, not enough to interfere at all with Judge Schultz's
dissolution hearings. 30' It is hard not to conclude from these
figures that a large majority of the litigants leave the specialized
courts satisfied with the decisions of the referees. As will be argued
below, however, the significance of satisfied decision-consumers is
not entirely clear. When private parties alone are involved, per-
haps any forum that they believe to be satisfactory is satisfactory.
It may be, however, that different considerations should come into
play when the state is a party, as in juvenile cases.
C Appeals beyond the Specialized Courts: Supreme Court Controls on
the Reference Process
The number of cases appealed to the supreme court on the issue
of trial judge supervision of referees has, until recent years, been
miniscule.30 2 The decisions in these cases are important, however,
because they seem to indicate conflicting views as to how the refer-
ees should fit into the judicial system.
In Peterson, the court suggested that the job of the referee should
be a "narrowing of the dispute," that "cannot help but promote
more efficient, careful decision making by the family court judge,
for it enables both counsel for the parties and the judge to move
directly to the decisive issues which find support in the record. ' 30 3
299. See Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158.
300. Id.
301. See Interview with G.A. Hatfield, supra note 34.
302. The question of whether compulsory reference is appropriate in a given case is
appealable. See, e.g., St. Paul & S.C.R.R. v. Gardner, 19 Minn. 132 (Gil. 99) (1872). This
issue, however, is not likely to arise in modern litigation. Once the trial court adopts the
findings of a referee, these findings have the same force and effect as findings made by the
court itself, for purposes of appeal. See Prior Lake State Bank v. National Sur. Corp., 248
Minn. 383, 389, 80 N.W.2d 612, 617 (1957). The major remaining issue, then, is what
force and effect referee findings should have at trial.
303. Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 306, 242 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976). The Peterson
court also suggested that the work of federal magistrates, as discussed in Matthews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976), provides a useful analogy to referees in Minnesota courts. See
308 Minn. at 306 n.5, 242 N.W.2d at 94 n.5.
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Peterson contemplates a process, at least for child custody adjudica-
tion, in which a referee hears oral testimony as a basis for recom-
mended findings that are then considered by a judge who is
familiar with the testimony on the record.
304
In the more recent case of Berg v. Berg,30 5 the referee's job of
predigesting the dispute for the judge was set forth in greater de-
tail:
The assistance which a referee renders by narrowing and focus-
ing the issues should not be understated. In many cases once
the issues being litigated have been sharply drawn by a hearing
before a referee, the parties will recognize that further litigation
before a judge of the district court would be unproductive.
Even if the district court is called upon to review a referee's
decision, the time required to decide the case will ordinarily be
greatly reduced by virtue of the referee's prior work.
30 6
Thus it appears that the supreme court sees the referee as per-
forming two distinct functions for the district judge. The first
function is that of the Peterson "pretrial specialist" 30 7 who sharpens
the issues under dispute so they go before the judge with a record
and with recommended findings already prepared. The other
function, to paraphrase bluntly the language of Berg, is to get some
cases off the calendar altogether by convincing one of the parties
to quit before getting to the judge. 308 To accomplish this goal, it is
necessary that referees appear to the litigants as something more
than pretrial issue-shapers; the referees want the parties before
them to feel they have had their day in court. Hence, referees use
various judicial symbols such as black robes, elevated benches, and
the title "Your Honor.
'30 9
Later cases indicate that the line between the Peterson and the
Berg versions of family court referee functions will be drawn ac-
304. See 308 Minn. at 306, 242 N.W.2d at 94.
305. 309 Minn. 281, 244 N.W.2d 149 (1976) (per curiam).
306. Id. at 285, 244 N.W.2d at 151-52.
307. Silberman, supra note 68, at 1106. In addition to their other duties, referees con-
ducted many pretrial hearings or conferences in the family courts during 1976. See Statis-
tics as to Hearings in Hennepin County Family Court, supra note 174 (659 in Hennepin
County); Statistical Data, supra note 175 (404 in Ramsey County); Referee's Report, supra
note 176 (150 in St. Louis County). According to Judge Sedgwick, "referees 'sort out'
cases to some extent, and will request early court hearings where a critical or explosive
situation exists." Letter from Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 18.
308. See Berg v. Berg, 309 Minn. 281, 285, 244 N.W.2d 149, 151-52 (1976) (per
curiam).
309. Referee McLean explained that the litigants see that black robe up there and they
think that they are in court. See Interview with Referee Daniels McLean, supra note 281.
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cording to whether or not child custody is involved. In Seber v.
Sieber,310 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a family court
judge's decision to affirm referee findings that were based only on
affidavits, not oral testimony.31' The decision that no oral testi-
mony was needed was made by the referee. 3' 2 Because the issue
was not one relating to child custody, but rather, whether alimony
arrearages should be forgiven, the supreme court held it was
proper to proceed by affidavits.313 A few months later, in Beaudet v.
Beaudet,31 4 the supreme court stated explicitly that, although the
family court judge's order vacating earlier alimony and property
division stipulations was based on a less thorough review of the
referee's findings than was required by Peterson, the judge's review
process was adequate because there was no child custody issue.315
Apparently, when the subject of dispute is money, the family court
judge need not do much more to affirm the referee's findings than
state that the referee who made the findings was competent to
hear the testimony and heard the testimony. 3' 6 It should be easy,
then, in the language of Berg, for a referee to convince parties to a
property dispute that "further litigation before a judge. . . would
be unproductive." '3 7
A child custody issue was involved in Griffin v. Van Gr(fn, 318
when the family court referee ordered that a father, behind in his
support payments, could begin to have limited visitation rights. 31 9
The family court judge, after a new hearing and a reading of the
record, denied visitation to the father on the ground that visits
would not be in the child's best interests. 320 On appeal the
supreme court upheld the family court judge, reiterating the Peter-
son view that a referee's findings and order are "advisory only."'32'
In the family court, then, it appears that the force of the referees'
findings may be determined by what is at stake. A thorough re-
310. 258 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1977).
311. See id. at 756.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. 263 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam).
315. See id. at 426-27.
316. See id. at 426 (quoting trial court's memorandum adopting referee's findings).
317. Berg v. Berg, 309 Minn. 281, 285, 244 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1976) (per curiam).
318. 267 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1978).
319. See id. at 735.
320. See za'.
321. Id. at 735 n. 1.
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view of the referee's findings will be necessary only when an issue
relating to child custody is involved.
In juvenile court, although the double jeopardy issue may be
resolved, 322 questions still remain as to the advisability of having
two hearings in delinquency matters. 323 To put the issue very
briefly, who is the judge-the person who hears all the testimony,
evaluates credibility, and recommends a finding, or is it the person
who signs the final order? In Swisher v. Brad, 324 Justice Marshall
suggested that to separate these functions violates the due process
clause. 325 Even though he was unable to persuade four of his col-
leagues on this point, state legislatures are still free to decide
whether the present division of labor, which designates the order-
signer as lhe judge, has elevated form over substance.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has left trial court judges with
wide discretion over what effect they choose to give to referee find-
ings. 326 Although referees appear to retain considerable power,
appeals and reversals of their decisions are infrequent.327 This sug-
gests that, generally, referees are accountable to the bench and liti-
gants are satisfied with the results. Although opponents of referees
argue that they are not accountable to the public, 328 public opin-
ion seems to acknowledge the legitimacy of referee decision mak-
ing.
V. OPTIONS
The first report on the referee question that the Judicial Plan-
ning Committee received from its staff counsel listed seventeen
possible courses of action that alone, or in combination, could re-
solve the problem of whether to have referees in Minnesota's
courts. 329 Proposals for the retention of referees raise the further
question of what their functions should be-a problem also ad-
322. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 219 (1978) (compelling juvenile to go through
procedure a second time after referee finding of nondelinquency does not violate double
jeopardy).
323. See notes 142-45 supra and accompanying text.
324. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
325. See id. at 229-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
326. See, e.g., Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 304, 242 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976)
("findings and orders of a family court referee in custody matters are advisory only").
327. See notes 295-301 supra and accompanying text.
328. Se note 265 supra and accompanying text.
329. See Issue Paper for Planning Subcommittee of Judicial Planning Committee,
supra note 36, at 17-18.
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dressed in the report. 330 All of the suggested options are presented
below, grouped for convenience into four categories. Not all of the
proposals are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, an attempt has
been made to indicate when several ideas might have to be com-
bined to produce a workable overall plan. At least four questions
should be examined in evaluating each option:
(1) Human resources: will the work of the courts be done
under this plan, without intolerable backlogs?
(2) Due process: does this plan properly allocate functions be-
tween judicial and nonjudicial personnel?
(3) Personnel: is this plan fair to the people who presently
hold jobs in the court system?
(4) Specialization: how would this plan affect the specialized
courts?
A. Elminate Referees
A plan to eliminate referees was enacted into law by the 1977
Legislature, 33I but apparently no one thought it wise to let the
plan take effect. 332 Because of the need to give priority to juvenile
and family matters, without referees, judges would be taken from
the civil calendar to serve in those courts. 333 The result would be
that ordinary civil litigation could not take place.
334
Moreover, to the extent referees are appointed pursuant to "in-
herent powers of the court," 335 it is conceivable that legislative ab-
olition of their positions creates separation of powers problems. 336
Referees appointed by court order without enabling legislation,
such as the first family court referees, might argue that the Legisla-
330. See id. at 10-15.
331. See Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 432, § 48, 1977 Minn. Laws 1147, 1168 (current ver-
sion at MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978)).
332. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text. Even those legislators who have been
most critical of referees recognize that some alternatives are needed before referees are
phased out completely. See, e.g., Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra
note 5; Interview with State Representative Gordon 0. Voss, supra note 7.
333. See Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188.
334. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. According to Judge Minenko, "No-
body seems to make the concession that something like this is necessary to get the work
done. This is the system we have. It may not be perfect, but we haven't asked to have it
changed. They say it should be changed. Okay, but changed to what?" Interview with
Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188.
335. See notes 40, 76, 148 supra and accompanying text.
336. The Minnesota Constitution gives the Legislature control over judicial officers,
but the term jhdiza/ is not defined. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. Thus, there is some
room for debate over the degree to which referees exercise judicial functions.
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ture lacks the power to eliminate their jobs. Several state courts
have ruled that these inherent court powers cannot be abrogated
by legislation.
337
B. Replace Referees with Judges
Substituting judgeships for referee positions has the obvious ad-
vantage of ensuring that all judicial functions are performed by
judges.338  One major obstacle, however, would be cost. The
judges who were interviewed by the Judicial Planning Committee
agreed that it would take at least one full-time judge to replace
each full-time referee. 339 Not only are the salaries of judges higher
337. See, e.g., In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich. 660, 663, 255 N.W.2d 635, 636 (1977) (sua
sponte opinion informing Legislature that open meeting law compelling court delibera-
tions to be open to the public violated constitutional endowment of specified powers to the
courts); Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 386 Mich. 1, 33, 190
N.W.2d 228, 240 (1971) (compelling county to provide funds for certain judicial officers
pursuant to inherent powers of court), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); cf. Mattfeld v.
Nester, 226 Minn. 106, 121, 32 N.W.2d 291, 303 (1948) ("Independent of statute, courts
have such power [to supply any omission in any proceeding or record] as an inherent
one."). Thus, some cases seem to provide some general support for Judge Arthur's view
that "the courts ought to be running the judicial branch of government." Interview with
Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108.
338. See Gough, supra note 87, at 14 ("Questions could be raised on a theoretical level
as to whether referees should be used at all. Ideally, all judicial functions should be per-
formed by regularly-appointed judges."); ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJ-
ECT, supra note 279, at 22 (The juvenile court is striving to overcome the inferior rank it
has held for so long within the family of courts, and its use of referees has symbolized its
inferior status. Competent referees should become judges.). Hennepin County Public De-
fender William Kennedy agrees with this view, stating that "as a lawyer, I'd like to see all
the positions [in juvenile court] be judgeships." Interview with William Kennedy, supra
note 104. One commentator has explained why referees are not included in family courts
in New York:
[T]he chief draftsman of the New York Family Court Act felt that a referee
position would have been out of keeping with the spirit of the Act. Under his
view, the whole tenor and thrust of New York's Act was to affix judicial responsi-
bility for intervention in the lives of citizens. Referees would have detracted
from that purpose, rather than aiding its realization.
Dyson & Dyson, supra note 146, at 578.
Of course, the notion that referees should be replaced with judges does not enjoy
universal support. See, e.g., Clark, Parajudges and the Adminitrratton ofJustice, 24 VAND. L.
REV. 1167, 1172 (1971) ("Rather than more judges, I submit that we need to change our
attitude about the functions that require a judge's attention."). Referee Truax feels that
the need for uniformity of dispositions and the supervisory powers of judges combine to
make the present system better for the juveniles who appear in his court than an all-judge
system would be. See Interview with Referee Kenneth M. Truax, supra note 110. See gener-
ally Hazard,Justice Courts in Oregon.- An Introduction, 53 OR. L. REV. 407 (1974); Parness,
supra note 4.
339. See, e.g., Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108 (six judges re-
quired to replace five referees; "Judges play more golf than referees. We get more work
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than those of referees,340 but judges also are entitled to a greater
number of support personnel. 341 Moreover, because counties pay
referees and the state pays judges, 342 a change from referee posi-
tions to judgeships would result in a drastic reallocation of judicial
costs.
Other problems also might arise, depending on where the per-
sons to fill new judgeships would be found. One of the first formal
reactions to the 1977 abolition was a recommendation by a meet-
ing of referees "[t]hat the fulltime referees existing on June 1, 1977,
be retained as judges or referees. ' ' 343 If the present referees, a
number of whom have given up lucrative private practices to train
themselves for work in the specialized courts, were not given the
judgeships, questions of fairness would arise.344 On the other
out of the referees than we would if we had judges."); Interview with Judge Ronald E.
Hachey, supra note 3 (noting that it would be necessary to appoint one judge to replace
each referee); cf. Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188 ("I don't
think fewer [judges] than the number of referees could do it. . . . [The referees'] schedule
is solid and they are hearing an awful lot of cases.").
One legislator has suggested that this need for creating more judgeships might be
alleviated by bringing county court judges into the metropolitan area for 15 days each
year, pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 2.724(1) (1978). See Interview with State Senator Robert
Tennessen, supra note 5. Judge Minenko, however, doubts whether this provision really
will make a big difference to the Hennepin County District Court calendar. See Interview
with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188. Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals apparently agrees with Judge Minenko on this point. See
Kaufman, Thejudial Crsz3, Court Delay and the Para-Judge, 54 JUD. 145, 147 (1970) ("Sim-
ply creating more judgeships to cope with increased court business is a long, expensive,
frustrating, and often inefficient procedure for reducing court congestion."). Rather than
using more judges, Judge Kaufman favors more extensive use of parajudges to combat
overloaded calendars. See id.
340. Compare MINN. STAT. § 15A.083(1) (Supp. 1979) (judge's annual salary is
$45,000) with id. § 15A.083(6) (1978) (referee salaries limited to 90% ofjudge salaries). In
1977, the top salary for a referee in Hennepin County was $37,800, and $33,280 for a
referee in Ramsey County. See Interview with Referee Gerald Alfveby, supra note 184. As
Special Term Referee Haeg-whose salary is approximately $2 5,000-says, "looking at
the economics of it, I'm a bargain." Interview with Thomas F. Haeg, supra note 64.
341. For example, Judge Arthur says that if referees in his court were replaced by
judges, two bailiffs, two court reporters, and probably five courtroom clerks would be
added. See Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108.
342. Compare MINN. STAT. § 15A.083(3) (1978) (state pays salaries for judges of district
courts, county courts, and municipal courts) with, e.g., id. § 260.031 (1) (counties pay sala-
ries for juvenile court referees) and id. §§ 484.64(3), .65(3) (counties pay salaries for family
court referees).
343. D. McLean, supra note 3, at 81.
344. Judge Minenko says that it would be a "pretty crass thing" to put the current
referees "out in the cold." Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188.
He would favor "grandfathering-in" present referees if their positions were replaced by
judgeships, provided it could be done. See id.
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hand, there seems to be no constitutional way to ensure their ap-
pointment.
345
Another question raised by the referees is whether, if judgeships
replaced referee positions, judicial rotation would destroy the spe-
cialized courts.346 Judge Sedgwick, who is firmly committed to
"the concept of a specialized family court," believes that "making
the referees judges will predicate their rotation and end the spe-
cialized court." 347  Although some referees disagree with Judge
Sedgwick on this point, 3 4 the only way to guarantee that rotation
would not occur would be to amend the family court and juvenile
court statutes to provide for the appointment of "family court
judges" and "juvenile court judges. '349 The accumulated exper-
tise of the present referees would be lost unless they were ap-
pointed to these positions.
One more problem would affect juvenile courts. The existing
system allows what amounts to an intermediate appeal, from juve-
nile court referee to juvenile court judge. On this point, former
Ramsey County Juvenile Court Judge Gingold states that "[i]f the
referees were all judges, an appeal would go to the Supreme Court
from the juvenile court. This would hurt accessibility.
'350
C Restore Referees to Pre-1977 Status
Beyond the desirability of retaining specific individuals who
have put in years of good service and have developed specialized
skills, there are other advantages to having referees. There is the
345. Cf MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (vacancy in office of judge to be filled by appoint-
ment by governor).
346. See D. McLean, supra note 3, at 82 (recommending "[t]hat specialized family and
juvenile court divisions be maintained and staffed by fulltime personnel").
347. Letter from Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 18.
348. See, e.g., Letter from Referee Edward P. Dietrich, supra note 209 (suggesting that
referees, if made judges, would not want to rotate "because we have people who are spe-
cialists and have willingly assumed the responsibility for this position").
349. Presently, the district court judges in charge of juvenile and family courts are
required to rotate. See MINN. STAT. § 260.019(3) (1978) (no judge can be principally or
exclusively assigned to juvenile court for more than three years out of any six); id.
§ 484.65(1) (no judge can be appointed to serve consecutive two-year terms in Hennepin
County Family Court). But see id. § 484.64 (statute establishing Ramsey County Family
Court does not require judge rotation).
350. Interview with Judge Archie L. Gingold, supra note 267. Other commentators
suggest, however, that because judges' opinions might carry more weight than those of
referees, there might be fewer appeals from juvenile court judge decisions to the supreme
court than there are appeals from referee decisions to judges. See Fuller & Solomon, supra
note 212, at 15.
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value of the uniformity of decisions resulting from a single-judge
court that, as indicated above, has been sharply debated.3 5' There
is also flexibility in that referees can be added on a part-time basis
to deal with a sudden bulge in a court's calendar. 352 A related
virtue of refereeships is that referees' calendars are generally more
flexible than judges' calendars.3 53 Thus, referees can provide con-
tinuity in handling problems over a long period of time.354 Addi-
tionally, the use of referees rather than judges tends to be cost-
effective.
3 55
The advantages outlined above, however, do not meet the ques-
tion of how to allocate functions between referees and judges.
While many of the duties presently performed by referees could be
characterized as "nonjudicial" or "quasi-judicial," 356 some could
351. See notes 210-12 supra and accompanying text.
352. See Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108. Of course, this prob-
lem also can be handled by bringing in retired or out-state judges. See MINN. STAT.
§ 484.61 (1978) (retired judge may be appointed and assigned to hear district court cases);
cf Interview with Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188 (questioning effectiveness
of using out-state judges to hear cases for short periods of time).
353. See State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 213 Minn. 184, 192, 6 N.W.2d
251, 258 (1942) ("The appointment of a referee is for the convenience of the parties and
the court or tribunal; it is often desirable in the interests of expedition and economy, and,
as in the case before us, may appear necessary to avoid both delay and interruption and to
insure orderly procedure.").
354. See Interview with Referee Daniels McLean, supra note 281 (The present system
provides "tremendous economy of court time, getting rid of subsequent appearances. A
court appearance is evidence that we haven't helped people resolve their problem. This is
where the continuity of experts makes such a difference."); notes 150-51 supra and accom-
panying text.
355. See notes 339-42 supra and accompanying text. Former Ramsey County Attorney
William B. Randall believes that, if Ramsey County added a fourth referee to family
court, the resulting expedition of support decisions would save the county $100,000 per
year in welfare payments, twice the cost of the referee and supporting staff. See Interview
with William B. Randall, Former Ramsey County Attorney (Nov. 16, 1977) (on file at
William Mitchell Law Review office).
356. According to Judge Schultz, "Not everything that a referee hears is a judgmental
thing. It doesn't take a judge to find out somebody's income or fixed expenses." Interview
with Judge Harold W. Schultz, supra note 194; see Interview with G.A. Hatfield, supra note
34 ("[T]hey're performing a function that is removing some of the minor aggravations
[and] detailed work. A law clerk performs research for the judge; you could say 'Let's have
judges do that research.'"); cf. Ashman & Parness, The Concept ofa Unifd Court System, 24
DE PAUL L. REv. 1, 33 (1974) (recommending that judicial officers, if under proper con-
trol, be used to assist judges); Feldman, A Statutoy Proposal to Remove Dw'orceftom the Court-
room, 29 ME. L. REV. 25, 33 (1977) ("To divide property, award custody of children and
free a couple from an unhappy marriage, one needs only objectivity and the authority of
the state. Judges and lawyers are not needed as such."). Seegenerally Comment, The Family
Court, 7 OTTAWA L. REv. 251, 256 (1975) ("The Institute is not convinced that all judges
need be lawyers. . . . [w]e need judges of whatever background, who are sensitive to new
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not. 35 7 This difficulty is aggravated by a dislike on the part of
many judges for juvenile and family court matters.3 58 Perhaps the
judges' preferences should be disregarded. 359 On the other hand, it
is axiomatic that those in authority will delegate- unpleasant duties
if they can. 360 Conceivably, referees' duties could be specified by
legislation or by court rule. The referee question, however, is a far
more delicate area than controlling referees' salaries36' or placing
referees under the supervision of the Board on Judicial Stan-
dards.
3 62
A less ticklish course would be simply to reinstate the authority
of the referees as it existed prior to 1977. This option has been
favored, at least initially, by the Ramsey County Court Adminis-
trator 36 3 and a large majority of the Ramsey County bar.364 A
slight modification of this plan would allow referees to be assigned
outside juvenile and family courts, as needed. A narrow majority
of the Ramsey County lawyers surveyed found this variation to be
family forms, cultures, roles and environments and not just to family law and some single
idealized form.").
357. For example, contested trials of delinquency petitions in juvenile court could not
be characterized as merely being quasi-judicial. See note 109 supra and accompanying
text.
358. See Interview with Judge Harold W. Schultz, supra note 194 (noting that family
court litigants tend to call judges at home late at night; "I dislike the family court ...
You're dealing with people who are . . . emotionally involved and upset."); Letter from
Judge Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 18 ("Many lawyers and judges do not like the
emotional overlay involved with domestic matters."). For a discussion of the difficulties in
attracting judges to family and juvenile courts, see Waite, Children of Divorce in Minnesota.
Between the Millstones, 32 MINN. L. REv. 766 (1948); Winnet, Ft/y Years f the Juvenile Court:
An Evaluation, 36 A.B.A.J. 363 (1950).
359. According to Senator Tennessen, "We have certain cases that come before the
court and they have to be judged, and we try to have a system of accountability." Inter-
view with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5.
360. See THE ILIAD OF HOMER, Book I (S. Butler trans. 1952) (Agamemnon delegates
to subordinates task of taking Briseis from Achilles); notes 69-72 supra and accompanying
text.
361. See generally Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 I1. 98, 108, 113 N.E. 852, 856 (1916) (re-
ducing award of chancery master's fees in divorce action); note 340 supra and accompany-
ing text (discussing referee salaries).
362. Presently, referees are subject to supervision by the Board on Judicial Standards.
See note 267 supra and accompanying text. Judge Sedgwick feels that supervising judges
have the responsibility to deal with any potential referee problems before they reach the
stage where the Board on Judicial Standards would intervene. See Interview with Judge
Susanne C. Sedgwick, supra note 61.
363. See Interview with G.A. Hatfield, supra note 34.
364. When asked whether referees should be retained in their present positions in fam-
ily court, 226 members of the Ramsey County Bar responding to the survey favored their
retention, while 27 were opposed. See RAMSEY BARRISTER, Nov., 1977, at 3. Similarly,
169 members favored retaining referees in juvenile court, while 27 were opposed. See id.
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acceptable. 365 From the referees' point of view, a disadvantage of
these options is that they present no guarantee that referee posi-
tions would not be abolished again by subsequent legislation. 366
Another possibility, suggested by Judge Bowen, would be "to
continue the referees but put them under the state system, with
protection for their accumulated county pension rights. ' 367 Ap-
parently, the only overt change this would make in the existing
system is the reallocation of costs. In the long run, however, be-
coming state employees might provide the referees with greater job
security, though possibly at the eventual cost of having the Legis-
lature spell out their duties.
D. New Mixtures ofJudges and Referees
A number of plans have been suggested under which referees
and judges would continue to coexist. These ideas range from sim-
ply renaming the referees "magistrates," 368 to complex reorganiza-
tions of the specialized courts that include multiple judges and
referees in each. 36 9 Any proposal that is considered should be re-
quired to differentiate between judicial and nonjudicial functions.
As one legislator who has studied the problem puts it, "where a
referee is used in a court function, and you want it to be a court
function, that referee should be replaced with a judge. '370
A plan that might satisfy the need for differentiating functions
365. One hundred thirteen responses favored this proposal, and 106 responses were
opposed. See id. This plan carries with it the possibility of detracting from the value of
specialized skills which referees have developed.
366. See Interview with William E. Haugh, Jr., supra note 3. ("The referees would be
nervous about how long it would be before the legislature did it again.").
367. Interview with Judge Robert E. Bowen, supra note 158.
368. See, e.g., Interview with Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, supra note 108; Interview with
Chief Judge Eugene Minenko, supra note 188.
369. Juvenile courts in the cities of Detroit, Denver, and Los Angeles presently use
combinations of referees and judges. See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT,
supra note 279.
370. Interview with State Representative Gordon 0. Voss, supra note 7. Senator Ten-
nessen agrees that any such system should prevent referees from hearing controversial
matters. See Interview with State Senator Robert Tennessen, supra note 5.
An eighteenth-century commentator noted, however, that it is often difficult to distin-
guish non-judicial functions from judicial:
[I]t is one thing to exercise judicial authority in a court, and another thing to be
a Judge of that court. Every officer of a court who assists and helps the Judge in
the exercise of judgement, so far as such assistance goes, does a judicial act, but
yet he is not thereby the Judge.
Bryant, supra note 29, at 501 (quoting S. BURROUGHS, THE LEGAL JUDICATURE IN CHAN-
CERY (London 1727)).
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has been proposed by Ramsey County District Court Judge Jo-
seph P. Summers.37' His plan is based on the 1966 proposal by
Judge Arthur to integrate family court, juvenile court, and some
municipal court functions, so that legal problems relating to mar-
riage, children, and assaultive misdemeanors within a household
could all be handled in one court. 372 Judge Summers does not
contemplate that the court be staffed by a single judge, but rather,
there should be several judges as well as referees. 373 Referees
would be able to hear all uncontested matters and part-time refer-
ees could be brought in to deal with "peaks in judicial business.
'374
As the present referees retired, it could be provided that no new
referee be appointed unless a study by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and the Court Administrator indicated that such
an appointment was needed to handle the work.3 75 Furthermore,
a provision such as "No order authorizing the filling of a referee
position shall become effective until July of the year next following
the year in which it is entered," would give the Legislature ample
opportunity to replace the position with ajudgeship or eliminate it
entirely.376 Thus, referees could be phased out slowly, if this were
thought desirable, without abrupt termination of existing jobs.
377
A similar proposal that evolved from discussions among the
referees themselves would be to combine all of the above functions
under the aegis of municipal court.378 Legislation could recom-
mend that existing referees be considered for the new municipal
court judgeships that would be necessary. 379 Those referees who
371. See Interview with Judge Joseph P. Summers, supra note 260.
372. See generally Arthur, supra note 146. Conceivably, the guardianship and commit-
ment functions of probate court could be added as well.
373. See Interview with Judge Joseph P. Summers, supra note 260. Judge Minenko
agrees that it might be appropriate to combine juvenile and family courts, while adding
new judgeships to assist in cases where affidavits of prejudice are filed, and possibly to
lessen complaints opposing a single-judge court. See Interview with Chief Judge Eugene
Minenko, supra note 188.
374. Interview with Judge Joseph P. Summers, supra note 260. The occasional use of
part-time referees might present conflict of interest problems unless controls like those
used in Hennepin County Conciliation Court were adopted. See generally note 253 supra
and accompanying text.
375. See Interview with Judge Joseph P. Summers, supra note 260.
376. See id.
377. Cf Fuller & Solomon, supra note 212, at 16 (discussing recommendation to
"[r]educe the number of referees and seek additional judgeships when the integrated fam-
ily court is created").
378. See Interview with Referee Daniels McLean, supra note 281.
379. See id.
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were not made judges could stay on as referees until retirement.38 0
Judges from the general bench could be assigned to preside over
the municipal court for non-consecutive two-year terms. 38 1 This
practice would assure that referee expertise is preserved, while pe-
riodically providing the municipal court with a source of new
ideas.a 2 Although this plan would make those referees who were
appointed judges more accountable to the electorate, any account-
ability problems that presently exist would continue with respect
to those who remain referees. Another disadvantage could result
from perceived stigmatization of family problems by their relega-
tion to a "lower court." This drawback would diminish in serious-
ness, however, as court integration proceeds.
383
VI. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE QUASI-JUDGE: THREE MODELS
OF REFEREE PARTICIPATION IN LEGAL CONFLICT
For the moment, the passage of the 1978 law seems to have re-
solved some of the conflicts suggested by the options presented
above. The fact that the Legislature directed the supreme court to
complete a major study by October, 1980384 strongly suggests that
this law is intended as a temporary measure, a compromise that
will keep the referees in their jobs and keep the specialized courts
operating until sometime in 1981. The law is a practical means of
meeting the immediate needs of the courts. The differences among
several early versions of the bill that became the 1978 law indicate,
however, that the Legislature is far from settling the ultimate ques-
tion of what the referees' role in the courts will be, if any, in the
long run. 3 5 The Legislature's mandate to the Minnesota Supreme
Court shows an awareness that the next time this question is con-
sidered, it should be discussed in the context of a much better theo-
retical understanding of the courts than that represented by the
tautology "judging should be done by judges." The following cri-
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. See id.
383. Cf MINN. STAT. § 15A.083(1)(3) (Supp. 1979) (municipal court judge salary
same as district court judge salary).
384. See MINN. STAT. § 260.019 (1978).
385. Compare S.F. 1586, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., as amended by Judicial Ad. Sub-
comm. of Senate Judiciary Comm., Mar. 2, 1978 (on file at Minnesota Legislative Refer-
ence Library) with Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, 1978 Minn. Laws 907 (amending scattered
sections of MINN. STAT. chs. 260, 484, 487, 508 (1978)).
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tiques of three conceptual models of referee functions are intended
to provide some of the background for such a discussion.
A. The Pre-Abolition Model and the Problem of Delegated Dzscretion
Americans conceive of courts as passive or reactive institutions
that do not seek out conflicts to resolve, but wait for parties to
bring conflicts to them.38 6 Only when presented with a conflict
will a court react by issuing an adjudicatory resolution. People
choose to resort to the court system for a variety of reasons.
387
Many parties to conflicts are attracted to courts because they feel
that judge-made decisions-as opposed to, for example, the
awards of arbitrators-are determined by rules.3 8 8 Decisions that
appear to be rule determined are thought to be predictable38 9 and
are perceived as conferring moral victories on successful parties. 390
In practice, however, decisions that have the superficial appear-
ance of being generated mechanically by rule application are often
the products of judicial discretion. 39' To be more specific, it would
be hard to imagine areas of the law in which judicial discretion has
more leeway than child custody allocations, 392 civil commit-
386. See generally Eckhoff, The Mediator, the Judge and the Admntlrator in Conftee-resolution,
in CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 148 (Blegvad ed. 1966).
387. See Aubert, Courts and Conflict Resolution, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 40, 41
(1967) ("A large proportion of the parties who appear before a court of law could have
stayed away if they had strongly preferred to do so. In this sense they are recruited to their
role in court on the basis of choice . . ").
388. Cf Eckhoff, supra note 386, at 161 ("Thejudge is distinguished from the mediator
in that his activity is related to the level of norms rather than to the level of interests. His
task is not to try to reconcile the parties, but to reach a decision about which of them is
right.") (emphasis in original). But cf. Nader, Styles of Court Procedure.- To Make the Balance,
in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 69-91 (Nader ed. 1969) (examining a court in rural
Mexico which administers case-by-case individualized justice, usually in the form of com-
promise, while dce-emphasizing rules; court's existence seems to depend upon long-term
relationships with the people in the surrounding community).
389. See Aubert, supra note 387, at 44.
390. Id.
391. According to one commentator:
There are two different ways in which the rule form shores up the legiti-
macy ofjudicial action. First, the discretionary elements in the choice of a norm
to impose are obscured by the process ofjustification that pops a rule out of the
hat of policy, precedent, the text of the Constitution, or some other source of law.
Second, once the norm has been chosen, the rule form disguises the discretionary
element involved in applying it to cases.
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjidication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1708
(1976).
392. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 226 (1975); Oster, Custody Proceedings. A Study of Vague and Indef -
nite Standards, 5J. FAM. L. 21 (1965). See generally Bryant v. Bryant, 264 Minn. 509, 512,
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ments, 393 and juvenile delinquency dispositions.3 94 Indeed, broad
discretion in these areas seems inevitable because they require
"person-oriented" rather than "act-oriented" determinations, that
is, "evaluation[s] of the 'whole person viewed as a social be-
ing.' -395
A leading study of child custody adjudication has suggested that
"person-oriented" decisions are so discretionary as to be virtually
unreviewable:
Because the trial court's decision involves an assessment of the
personality, character, and relationship of the people the judge
has seen in court, appellate Courts are extremely loath to upset
the trial court's determination on the basis of a transcript ...
Since only the broadest principle is typically announced in
these decisions, it is difficult to know when a trial judge has
acted upon some inappropriate principle or factor. Con-
strained little by precedent or appellate review, the trial court's
discretion is very wide indeed.
396
This analysis can be extended easily to cases involving termination
of parental rights, commitments, and juvenile court dispositions.
397
119 N.W.2d 714, 716-17 (1963) (trial court has wide discretion in allocating child cus-
tody). The general rule to be applied in child custody disputes is the determination of
what is in the best interests of the child. See id.
393. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(13) (1978) (probate court not bound by evidence
presented by examiners in civil commitment proceedings); id. § 253A.07(17)(a) (mentally
ill person can be committed for person's own welfare or for protection of society).
394. "[T]he power of thejudge to make essential decisions in the disposition of individ-
ual cases remains great. Traditionally, these decisions have been based upon a number of
extralegal criteria, usually personal and social characteristics of the offending youth."
Scarpitti & Stephenson, Juvenile Court Disposztions: Factors in the Decision-making Process, 17
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 142, 143 (1971).
One commentator takes a jaundiced view of this wide discretion in juvenile courts:
To some the dispositional decision ought to be left to those experts in achieving
beneficial changes in human behavior. For these, the choices to be made are
clinical or educational. 'How can we best serve the needs of this child?' is the
classic way of putting the issue. The answer, however, will often turn on facts
that ought to be tested by the constant, searching creative questioning of the
adversary process. Experts, particularly experts who must deal with large num-
bers of cases, grow weary, make mistakes, take short cuts, bend to frustration,
and, in some cases, respond to dislike and prejudice.
Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 233, 256.
395. Mnookin, supra note 392, at 250-51 (quoting unpublished paper of L. Fuller).
396. Id. at 254. Ultimately, the author concludes that children's interests would be
better protected by a considerable narrowing of judicial discretion in the area of child
custody adjudication. See id. at 277.
397. Cf notes 281-83 supra and accompanying text (family court decisions); notes 284-
86 supra and accompanying text (civil commitment proceedings); note 287 supra and ac-
companying text (juvenile court decisions).
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It also applies to the referee-judge relationship as well as the rela-
tionship between trial and appellate courts.
A leading legal historian believes that the desire to make the
exercise ofjudicial discretion legitimate has led, historically, to the
election of judges.398 Judicial discretion represents an area of po-
litical decision making. Therefore, if judges were elected, "their
decisions would be democratic, and hence, in a democracy, legiti-
mate. '399 It may be assumed that this is the sort of reasoning that
led the framers of the Minnesota Constitution to require that
judges be "elected by the voters from the area which they are to
serve."4°
From this objective, legalistic point of view, therefore, it seems
anomalous that for so long Minnesota trial judges have been per-
mitted to delegate some of their most discretionary decision mak-
ing to non-elected officials. 4° 1 Seen in this light, there is room for
serious doubt whether person-oriented determinations made by
family and juvenile court referees are legitimate, as opposed to act-
oriented determinations, such as trust accountings, that tradition-
ally have been supervised by referees or chancery masters .
4
2
By prohibiting referees from hearing any final custody orders,
Judge Bowen's realignment of family court responsibilities in Hen-
nepin County begins to meet the objection to using referees to
make person-oriented determinations. 40 3 The use of juvenile court
referees, including a lay referee, to do ninety percent of the Henne-
pin County Juvenile Court dispositions, however, remains open to
criticism under this conceptual model. 40 4 At issue is the legitimacy
of discretionary decisions being made by judicial officials who are
not elected.
398. See Friedman, On Lega/t:tth Reasong---A Footnote to Weber, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 148,
162.
399. Id. at 162.
400. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
401. The objective, legalistic point of view suggested here is exemplified by Wechsler,
Toward Neutral %rnciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
402. For a discussion of the traditional act-oriented determinations, see notes 39-63
supra and accompanying text.
A contempt hearing, where the issue is whether a certain payment was made, is an
act-oriented determination. See MINN. STAT. § 518.24 (1978) (punishment for contempt
allowed for disobedience to court order to pay maintenance or support). Although a jail
term can result from a contempt hearing, this may be a less important consideration than
the fact that relatively little judicial discretion is involved.
403. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
404. See note 109 supra and accompanying text. This criticism is not aimed at the
people who are referees in juvenile court. Although they are experienced, dedicated, and
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Using referees to hear uncontested matters is not objectionable,
following this line of reasoning, because such hearings do not con-
stitute discretionary decision making. There is really no decision
to be made and consequently no discretion to be exercised. More-
over, even in contested matters, when the issue is act-oriented-
was a payment made by a certain date or not?--decision making
by referees does not really represent a delegation of discretionary
power. It is to be hoped that the distinction between judicial and
non-judicial functions was what prompted the Legislature, in the
1978 law, to remove some of the referees' powers to make person-
oriented decisions in contested matters.
405
B The Supreme Court Model- Shaping the Persuasive Conflict
The objective, abstract analysis of the legitimacy of referee func-
tions, which focuses on person-oriented versus act-oriented adjudi-
cation, by no means exhausts the points of view from which the
issue may be considered. As previously indicated by the low rate
of appeals, the parties to cases heard by referees appear to exhibit
a high degree of subjective satisfaction with referee decisions.
4
0
6
The factors that account for these perceptions of referee legitimacy
merit examination because to the extent that such factors may be
augmented without increasing the perceived illegitimacy of referee
decisions, the dispute-settlement function of the courts clearly ben-
efits.
40
7
One study has suggested that a major factor in a person's selec-
tion of courts as a dispute-settlement mechanism is that in court a
"persuasive conflict"-which is resolved by a verdict-takes the
place of the underlying dispute. 4°8 Ambiguous, complex problems
competent, the criticism is aimed at some of the specific functions which these referees are
required to perform.
Referees dispose of juvenile cases in Ramsey County as well; reference here is made to
Hennepin County because it has compiled more concrete statistics.
The problem of referees conducting adjudications of delinquency, however, may have
been resolved by the 1978 law. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907,
908 (prohibiting referees from hearing contested trials in juvenile court) (amending MINN.
STAT. § 484.70(3) (1976)).
405. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
406. See notes 295-301 supra and accompanying text.
407. Person-oriented determinations need to fulfill two functions; the dispute between
the parties must be settled, and the rights of each person involved must be decided. See
genera/'y Mnookin, supra note 392, at 229.
408. See Golding, Areliminanes to the Study of roceduraJustice, in LAw, REAsoN, AND
JUSTICE 71, 76 (Hughes ed. 1969).
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are clarified and resolved in the formal drama of trial.409 Often,
this court function is discussed only apologetically, as if it were an
oversimplication to narrow the shape of a conflict. For example,
parties to a divorce are made to focus on what may have been
years of vague dissatisfaction by adjudicating a few more-or-less
representative incidents of adultery or cruelty.410 While this role
of the courts is admittedly reductive, the reduction of a conflict to
manageable proportions may be just what the parties want, as in-
dicated by their choice of an adjudicatory forum as opposed to a
mediator or a marriage counselor. Moreover, in the field of juve-
nile law, the "persuasive conflict" in the courtroom may have
more of a rehabilitative impact on children than any other event
iri their passage through the justice system.
411
Referees believe that the parties to most family and juvenile
court cases perceive them as judges.412 Certainly in Hennepin
County Family Court it would be difficult for an uninitiated party
to differentiate between referees and judges. While referees have
somewhat smaller courtrooms and chambers, their rooms clearly
are courts, they wear the same robes as judges, and they are ad-
dressed as "Your Honor."'413 Here "it is the referee, from a point
of view as neutral as that of the judge, who helps focus attention
on the critical factual issues involved, the applicable legal princi-
ples, and the relevant portions of an often voluminous record
which support his evaluation of the cumulative effect of the evi-
dence and his recommended findings and order."'4' 4 In short,
while a referee cannot satisfy the parties' ultimate desire-a bind-
ing decision-the referee may have primary responsibility for im-
parting a shape to the persuasive conflict. Thus, the parties who
appear before referees emerge with the subjective feeling of having
had their day in court. Essentially, this is the Peterson court's view
409. See generaly id.
410. See Sarat & Grossman, Courts and Conflct Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of
Adjudication, 69 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REV. 1200, 1207 (1975).
411. See, e.g., Snyder, The Impact of the Juvenile Court Hearing on the Child, 17 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 180, 185 (1971) (in many cases "[tihe children's most positive attitudes
were toward the judge"). For a more recent compilation of studies on attitudes toward the
courts, see Sarat, Studying Ameriran Legal Culture.- An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 427, 466-69 (1977).
412. See note 309 supra.
413. In juvenile court, the judges and referees often use available courtrooms inter-
changeably.
414. Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 306, 242 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976).
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of referees as pretrial issue-shapers. 415
As will be seen, the referees not only help simplify issues for
trial,4 16 but they eliminate many trials completely by inducing the
parties to work out agreements themselves. This role complements
the supreme court's view in Berg of the ability of referees to dis-
suade further litigation before the judge.
4 17
Like the pretrial conference and, on the appellate level, the pre-
hearing conference, 4'8 the hearing before a referee encourages par-
ties to settle their cases.4 19  While there is some potential for
unfairness in all these mechanisms, whenever parties are per-
suaded to settle litigation on the basis of seemingly authoritative
predictions of final outcomes, there may be unjust results. 420 This
danger, however, is obviated in part by the presence of counsel.
Moreover, like other risks stemming from the delegation of discre-
tionary decision making, the hazard of less-than-perfect settle-
ments should be weighed against the desirability of prompt
decision making in courts handling family matters, especially
when disputes involve children.42' Although it remains to be seen
whether the Legislature struck a proper balance in the 1978 law, so
far, at least, there is no indication that the referees are compelling
unsatisfactory settlements.
415. See notes 303-04, 307 supra and accompanying text.
416. This is one of the functions of the pretrial conference. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 16(1).
See generally Louisell, Discovery and Are- Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 633
(1952) (discussing the use of the pretrial conference).
417. See notes 305-06 supra and accompanying text.
418. For an analysis of prehearing conferences, see Todd, Prehearing Conferences and a
Judge's Look at Appellate Advocacy, in MINNESOTA APPELLATE PRACTICE 25-40 (1978).
419. See Berg v. Berg, 309 Minn. 281, 285, 244 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1976) (per curiam).
420. In the criminal law context, much of the criticism of plea bargaining is based on
this insight. Cf State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761-62 (Minn. 1977) (discussing stan-
dards under which trial courts may accept guilty pleas while avoiding injustice), notedin 5
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 509 (1979).
421. The Peterson court recognized that referees are needed in family court to ensure
prompt decision making, stating, "the necessity for the routine use of family court referees
is plainly the ever-increasing volume and complexity of domestic relations litigation. We
take judicial notice of the impossibility of a single family court judge in a metropolitan
area handling this burden without assistance." Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 305,
242 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976). The same could be said for juvenile court. It should be added,
however, that the Peterson decision does not consider whether it is necessary to have only
one judge in each of these metropolitan courts. Perhaps additional judges could ensure
prompt decision making as well.
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C The Legzilature, Referees, and the Power to Incarcerate. Two Bills
and Some Ideas for the Future
The referee bill that became law in 1978 restored to the referees
many of the functions they had before their positions were abol-
ished.4 22 It also made three other substantial changes. First, refer-
ees were no longer "limited to assignment to family or juvenile
court. '423 Theoretically, this provision opens the possibility for a
dissatisfied chief judge to dismantle the specialized courts. Second,
in family court, referees were prohibited from hearing "any final
trial involving a contested case if either party or his attorney ob-
jects in writing. '424 This provision brings Ramsey and St. Louis
counties into compliance with Judge Bowen's Hennepin County
Family Court policy.425 Again, however, since most parties, and
their attorneys, who like the predictability of referees' decisions,
are satisfied with referees, there are not likely to be many objec-
tions.
The juvenile court is where the most substantial changes in pro-
cedure have occurred. In addition to barring referees from hear-
ing motions for reference of a juvenile to adult court,426 the 1978
law precluded referees from hearing "a contested trial on any peti-
tion. '42 7 This means that referees are no longer able to adjudicate
delinquency or termination of parental rights.428 Moreover, be-
cause a traffic ticket issued to a juvenile "shall have the effect of a
petition," it is doubtful whether the juvenile traffic court function
of the referees can be continued.4 29 These changes mean that
422. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 ("Referee[s] ...
may continue to serve ... under the terms and conditions of their appointment") (cur-
rent version at MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978)).
423. Id. (current version at MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978)).
424. Id. (current version at MINN. STAT. § 484.70(1) (1978)).
425. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
426. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 ("No referee
sitting in juvenile court may hear . . . any motion made pursuant to section 260.125.")
(amending MINN. STAT. § 484.70(3) (1976)). Referring a juvenile for trial as an adult is
the kind of motion authorized by section 260.125. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1978). In
Hennepin County during 1976, however, only one such motion was heard by a referee in
juvenile court. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
427. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 484.70(3) (1976)).
428. Both of these types of hearings proceed from petitions. See MINN. STAT.
§ 260.131 (1978) (procedure to petition for finding of delinquency); id. § 260.231 (proce-
dure to petition for termination of parental rights).
429. Compare id. § 260.193(2) (notice to juvenile to appear in court when accused of
traffic violation "has the effect of a petition and gives the juvenile court jurisdiction") with
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judges will have to do more juvenile court work. In recognition of
this increased workload, the 1978 law also included a section that
allows "one or more" judges to be assigned to juvenile court.
430
This increase of judge-time in juvenile court should be welcomed
both by critics of prior practice, who questioned the historical
credibility of juvenile courts operating as chancery courts under
the parens painae doctrine, 43 1 and by those whose sociological and
psychological surveys of juvenile offenders have pointed to the
judge-child relationship as the key to the effectiveness of these
courts. 432 Whether one's primary concern is the "objective legiti-
macy" of court decisions or the "persuasive conflict," the juvenile
courts have been improved by the 1978 law.
The possibility of more drastic changes in the future is suggested
by the Senate Judicial Administration Subcommittee report on its
version of a 1978 bill, Senate File 1586. 433 In the family courts, for
example, this bill provided that:
No referee may be assigned to hear any proceedings for civil
contempt, any other matter which may result in an order for
the confinement of any person, or any family court matter in
which the custody of children is contested, unless the parties or
their attorneys consent to the assignment of a referee to hear
the matter.
434
Such a provision would make even referee powers to hear tempo-
rary custody matters dependent on stipulation and would grant
the defendant in a contempt proceeding the right to demand a
hearing before a judge.
The question of whether referees in family court should hear
civil contempt cases appears to be a difficult one primarily because
confinement is a sanction that can be imposed in such a proceed-
Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 ("no referee sitting in juvenile
court may hear a contested trial on any petition") (amending MINN. STAT. § 484.70(3)
(1976)).
430. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 910 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 260.019(2) (1978)). Under the new law, juvenile court judge assignments also are
required to rotate at least once every three years. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 7,
1978 Minn. Laws 907, 910 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 260.019(3) (1978)).
431. See, e.g., Scarpitti & Stephenson, supra note 394; note 115 supra and accompanying
text.
432. See, e.g., note 411 supra and accompanying text.
433. S.F. 1586, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., as amended by Judicial Ad. Subcomm. of
Senate Judiciary Comm., Mar. 2, 1978 (on file at Minnesota Legislative Reference Li-
brary).
434. Id.
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ing.4 35 Nevertheless, the line of analysis that attempts to allocate
discretionary, person-oriented functions to judges, and non-discre-
tionary, act-oriented functions to referees, would seem to permit
referees to find people in contempt, because a determination of
contempt depends on a finding that a clear, *unambiguous court
order was disobeyed.4 36 While it is true that discretion is involved
in evaluating a defendant's ability to comply with a court order
and whether the threat of confinement likely will lead to compli-
ance, these determinations must be reduced to formal findings,
susceptible to review.437 To permit referees to hold contempt hear-
ings may thus be seen as part of the chancery tradition described
by Pound, in which masters are responsible for the supervision of
judges' orders.438 Moreover, as long as the family courts are single-
judge courts, there may be some advantage to defendants in hav-
ing their allegations of contempt heard before a different official
than the author of the final order that they allegedly violated.
In the juvenile court, Senate File 1586 proposed to restrict ref-
eree discretion as follows:
No referee may be assigned to hear any juvenile court matter
involving a reference for prosecution pursuant to section
260.125, any adjudicatory hearing which will resolve an issue
relevant to whether an order for the confinement of any person
may result, or any disposition hearing in which an order for
confinement may be made, unless the parties or their attorneys
consent to the assignment of a referee to hear the matter.
439
As with civil contempt, Senate File 1586 appears to have focused
on the possibility of incarceration as the major factor to determine
whether referees may participate in juvenile court matters. Never-
435. See MINN. STAT. § 518.24 (1978) (disobedience to family court order "may be
punished by the court as for contempt"); id. § 588.12 (contempt carries potential punish-
ment of "imprisonment until performance").
436. Enforcement of civil contempt has been explained as follows:
The order must have clearly defined the acts to be performed and the relief
granted. Only when courts have been explicit and precise in their commands
may they be strict in exacting compliance. A party seeking benefits under an
ambiguous and indefinite order may move for an order of clarification and inter-
pretation based upon the entire record; the latter may be enforced by contempt.
Sutherland & Iverson, Constnictive Civil Contempt in Minnesota, BENCH & B., Jan. 1969, at 10
(citations omitted). See generally Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 156 N.W.2d 212 (1968).
437. See Davis v. Davis, 280 Minn. 44, 47-48, 158 N.W.2d 196, 198-99 (1968); Hopp v.
Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 174-75, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216-17 (1968).
438. See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
439. S.F. 1586, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., as amended by Judicial Ad. Subcomm. of
Senate Judiciary Comm., Mar. 2, 1978 (on file at Minnesota Legislative Reference Li-
brary).
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theless, the purposes to be served by the confinement of juveniles,
and the degree of discretionary power involved in ordering a juve-
nile incarcerated, are considerably different from those in the con-
tempt area. Juveniles are incarcerated not for disobedience of a
clear court order, but because it is in their "best interests.' 44° This
is precisely the kind of discretion that should be exercised by
elected officials, if the historical arguments of Friedman and others
are persuasive. 44 1 In this respect it seems that the Senate was bet-
ter attuned to considerations of legitimacy or due process-not to
mention the persuasive aspects of a juvenile disposition hearing-
than was the conference committee that put together the final bill.
Perhaps none of the functions of juvenile court should be dele-
gated to referees. All of the work of this court requires person-
oriented evaluations of how specific individuals function in soci-
ety-hardly a "ministerial" role by any stretch of the imagination.
Because each adjudication is meant to be highly individualized,
arguments for the referee system based on "consistency" seem to
miss the point. Within the boundaries set by the equal protection
clause, the juvenile court should prefer a decision-making style
based on the uniqueness of each case to one based on "consis-
tency." Moreover, if consistency is required on a policy level, it
could just as well be derived from the interactions of a collegial
panel of several judges as from a supervisory relationship of one
judge and several referees. 442 Specialization could be fostered in a
multi-judge system by rotating judges every five or six years in
staggered terms rather than every two or three, as is the present
practice.
44 3
Finally, if the Legislature is indeed worried about citizens being
incarcerated by non-elected officials, it would do well to set new
guidelines for the participation of referees and commissioners in
the civil commitment proceedings of probate court. Commitment
to mental institutions is a far more serious area of concern than
such questions as whether Torrens title examiners are usurping ju-
dicial power, or whether parking violations are crimes. In fact, it
seems that no one besides a small minority of legislators would be
440. See MINN. STAT. § 260.185(i) (1978); f id. § 260.191(1) (same for dispositions
involving neglected or dependent children).
441. Seegeneral4' L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 110-12 (1973); notes
398-400 supra and accompanying text.
442. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
443. Set note 349 supra (discussing the existing requirements of judge rotation).
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much disturbed by a resolution that would allow all referees and
other quasi-judges, except for those in juvenile and probate courts,
to continue functioning indefinitely under the terms of the 1978
law.444 Such a resolution might not satisfy every concern, but it
would be a fair compromise between the complete abolition of
referees and their restoration to pre-1977 status.
The juvenile and probate courts should receive special atten-
tion, however, not because of criticism of any individuals presently
serving in the courts, but because their determinations are person-
oriented and because they represent major state interventions into
citizens' lives. Because both of these courts routinely use state
power to stigmatize and institutionalize individuals who come
before them, their discretionary decision-making functions should
be performed not by "ministerial" employees but by elected
judges.
VII. CONCLUSION
The role of referees in Minnesota has changed a great deal since
the days when they were assigned, on a case-by-case basis, to hear
actions requiring long accountings. Today, referees present the
face of the judiciary seen each year by thousands of citizens who
have problems involving marriage, children, land, money, and
mental illness. 445 The referees' traditional tedious balancing of
figures has been transformed into handling the emotional lives of
troubled people. This metamorphosis claims historical anteced-
ents that appear more persuasive, or less, depending on the specific
referee functions under discussion. Helping to divide property in a
marriage dissolution case, for example, is a harmless extension of
the chancery master's function of supervising partnership account-
ings.4 6 On the other hand, the delegation of discretionary author-
ity to determine what is "in the best interests" of a child-
presumably traceable to the equitable origin of the parens patrz'ae
444. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 484.70 (1976)).
445. See Tennessen, Court Reform 1977, HENNEPIN LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1977 at 8 ("Since
use of referees seems to be greatest in the kinds of cases in which a larger segment of the
public may become involved, such as dissolutions, traffic cases, and juvenile matters, the
public questioning seems legitimate."); D. McLean, supra -note 3, at 59 ("Approximately
84 percent of the contacts between the court and the public are made by the referees
446. See notes 67-77 supra and accompanying text.
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doctrine447-is contrary to the spirit of the requirement in the state
constitution that judges are to be elected.
448
Despite the unquestioned competence, expertise, and dedication
of the present specialized court referees, there will have to be a
reshaping of their duties. Perhaps the provision that referees may
be assigned outside the juvenile and family courts is an indication
that their abilities to "shape the persuasive conflict" are to be more
widely used in the district courts' civil calendar. In the future,
there also seems to be the possibility that some of their positions
will be replaced by additional judgeships.449 Meanwhile, the Leg-
islature's decision to preserve the referees' jobs and most of their
pre-1977 responsibilities pending further study seems a wise one.
Certainly the public that depends on the family and juvenile
courts to resolve its most difficult human problems has a right to
expect that major changes in these institutions will be carefully
considered. This Article may raise more questions than it answers,
but it is intended to be just an introduction to a discussion that has
been going on in England and the United States for a long time,
and can be expected to continue in Minnesota.
447. See notes 82-89, 97 supra and accompanying text.
448. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
449. For example, the original version of Senate File 1586 simply created ten more
judgeships in Hennepin County, six more in Ramsey County, and allowed the abolition of
referees to stand. See S.F. 1586, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., as amended by Judicial Ad.
Subcomm. of Senate Judiciary Comm., Mar. 2, 1978 (on file at Minnesota Legislative
Reference Library).
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